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Abstract	  
 
Land issue has been very important for Chinaʼs rural development. This thesis 
looks into the land issue in China and discusses whether the privatization of 
Chinaʼs collective land ownership could be a solution. 
The first part introduces the topic and explains the theoretical framework – the 
peasantsʼ “counter action”. It also gives brief account of the state of art and 
defines the scope of discussion. The second part talks about the historical 
background of Chinaʼs land issue from 1949 to 1978, giving detailed accounts 
of the Chinese Communist Partyʼs (CCP) land policies from land reform to 
collectivization and then to de-collectivization, especially how the CCP 
gradually turned private land ownership into collective one. “Counter action” is 
used to analyze the peasantsʼ behaviour that interacted with the CCP and 
finally influenced the CCPʼs policies both before and after 1978. The third part 
brings in the topic of land privatization and presents different opinions and 
arguments on a possible land privatization in China, followed by analyses on 
whether privatization would benefit the peasants, which brings out a 
conclusion that land privatization in China could benefit peasants in a way but 
does not necessarily solve all the problems that Chinese peasants are facing.  
 
Key words: “counter action”, collectivization, household responsibility system, 
collective land ownership, privatization  
 
 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung	  
 
Die Frage des Grundbesitzes ist sehr wichtig für die Entwicklung der 
chinesischen Landwirtschaft. Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit der 
Frage des Grundbesitzes in China und fragt, ob die Privatisierung des 
chinesischen Gemeineigentums eine Lösung sein könnte. Der erste Teil führt 
in das Thema ein und erklärt den theoretischen Rahmen – die bäuerliche 
„Gegenaktion“. Er umfasst auch eine kurze Beschreibung des aktuellen 
Forschungsstandes und eine Abgrenzung des Gegenstands der Diskussion. 
Der zweite Teil handelt von den historischen Hintergründen der Frage des 
Grundbesitzes in China zwischen 1949 und 1978 und beschreibt im Detail die  
Landpolitik der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (CCP) von der Landreform 
zur Kollektivierung und schließlich zu der Dekollektivierung; im Speziellen wird 
darauf eingegangen, wie die CCP privaten Grundbesitz in kollektiven 
umgewandelt hat. Die „Gegenaktion“ wird verwendet, um das Verhalten der 
Bauern zu analysieren, das auf die CCP eingewirkt und schließlich die Politik 
der CCP sowohl vor als auch nach 1978 beeinflusst hat,. Der dritte Teil 
beschäftigt sich mit dem Thema der Privatisierung von Landbesitz und 
präsentiert verschiedene Meinungen und Argumente zu einer möglichen 
Privatisierung in China. Danach folgt eine Analyse der Frage, ob die Bauern 
von einer Privatisierung profitieren würden, die zu dem Schluss kommt, dass 
die Bauern von einer Landprivatisierung in China in gewisser Weise 
profitieren würden, diese aber nicht notwendigerweise alle Probleme lösen 
würde, mit welchen die chinesischen  Bauern konfrontiert sind.	  
 
 
Page	  1	  of	  79	  
 
Table	  of	  Contents	  
PART	  I	  -­	  INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................2	  RESEARCH	  QUESTION....................................................................................................................................... 2	  THEORIES............................................................................................................................................................ 3	  STATE	  OF	  THE	  ART............................................................................................................................................ 5	  SCOPE	  OF	  DISCUSSION	  AND	  SOURCES............................................................................................................. 6	  
PART	  II	  -­	  BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................7	  LAND	  REFORM	  (TU	  GAI) .................................................................................................................................. 7	  COLLECTIVIZATION	  (HE	  ZUO	  HUA)...............................................................................................................11	  LABOR	  EXCHANGE...........................................................................................................................................13	  LOWER	  AGRICULTURAL	  PRODUCERS'	  COOPERATIVES.............................................................................15	  HIGHER	  AGRICULTURAL	  PRODUCERS’	  COOPERATIVES............................................................................19	  PEOPLE’S	  COMMUNE.......................................................................................................................................21	  FOM	  BIG	  COMMUNES	  TO	  SMALL	  COMMUNES ............................................................................................24	  PRIVATE	  PLOT .................................................................................................................................................27	  PEASANTS’	  COUNTER-­‐ACTION	  DURING	  THE	  COLLECTIVE	  TRANSFORMATION......................................28	  PEASANTS	  “COUNTER	  ACTION”	  IN	  THE	  POST-­‐1978	  PERIOD...................................................................35	  
PART	  III	  -­	  ISSUES	  OF	  LAND	  PRIVATIZATION ....................................................................... 36	  WHY	  THE	  LAND	  WAS	  NOT	  PRIVATIZED	  WITH/AFTER	  THE	  DE-­‐COLLECTIVIZATION? ..........................36	  WHY	  PRIVATIZATION	  SHOULD	  BE	  DISCUSSED	  NOW? ................................................................................39	  WHAT	  ARE	  THE	  ARGUMENTS	  ON	  THE	  PRIVATIZATION	  OF	  LAND? ..........................................................48	  WHAT	  IF	  PRIVATIZATION?.............................................................................................................................55	  
PART	  IV	  -­	  CONCLUSION............................................................................................................... 66	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY: ............................................................................................................................ 68	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Page	  2	  of	  79	  
Part I - Introduction 
Research	  Question	  
The world has witnessed Chinaʼs fast Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
after it started reform and adopted opening-up policy since 1978. Although 
with great difficulties, China has been taking its efforts to change itself from a 
closed planned economy to a much more open market economy.  
China has made enormous achievements in developing its urban areas, 
marching towards its goal of the modernization of industries, making China 
into a world factory; advancing in urbanization, building up modern cities like 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which are parallel in modernization as 
their counterparts in the West. 
However, compared to urban areas, it is also widely acknowledged that the 
majority of Chinaʼs rural areas are far lagging behind. Under the surface of 
Chinaʼs great achievements are the widening gaps between the developed 
East and the much less-developed West, between the rich coastal areas and 
the poor inland regions, between the exceedingly wealthy families and the 
families struggling at poverty line.  
The imbalanced development and government-manipulated difference 
between the urban and rural areas become factors undermining the stability 
and shadow the remarkable economic achievements. Therefore, rural 
development is topped on the working agenda of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). 
Chinaʼs double-digit GDP growth demands good infrastructure (airports, 
railways, highways, etc.), which are in need of considerable amount of land. 
Economic development and urbanization also demands plenty of land. 
Therefore, more land is needed by the government and real estate companies 
to build industrial parks and other commercial constructions.  
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Besides state-owned land, the government also acquired a lot of collectively 
owned land, many of which have been contracted to peasants for farming. 
However, peasants have been poorly paid for the land that was taken away 
from them. As peasantsʼ rights over their land have been constantly violated, 
there have been discussions for solutions. Since the Chinese government 
allows multi-ownership entities after the economic reform, it also privatized 
many of its state-owned enterprises.  
As such, privatization surfaced as a possible solution to rural development 
and to protect peasantsʼ rights over their land.  
But is privatization a solution to those problems? Is it relevant with rural 
development and agricultural modernization? What would happen to the 
peasants if land privatization were to be introduced in the end? Will the 
peasants receive more benefits than losses? These are the questions I will 
discuss and analyze in this thesis. 
Theories	  	  
To understand the land issues in China, we have to first understand the role 
that the CCP (to certain extent, the CCP represents the state) has been 
playing.  
After the CCP founded the Peopleʼs Republic of China in 1949, it has been 
the exclusive ruling party in China. Considering the fact that the CCP has 
been the sole player in policymaking and policy implementation since then, 
every single move that it took undoubtedly had influenced Chinaʼs rural 
society and peasantsʼ daily life. For this reason, I will introduce major policies 
that the CCP had adopted for its vision of building a socialist China. 
Besides the CCPʼs changing policies in agriculture, it is also very important to 
understand the behaviour of the peasants. 
Traditionally and in most of the cases, especially in slave and feudal societies, 
peasants are the powerless, the dominated and the weak. Yet the weak also 
has its weapons. Besides open resistance, the peasants have offstage 
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resistance (hidden transcript) in words (Scott 1990) and other forms of 
resistance go beyond words (Scott 1985): petty theft, killing of animals, just to 
name some. James Scott believes, to put it in Danny Yeeʼs (1994) words, 
“elite values do not really penetrate into the lower classes; inevitability is not 
seen as implying legitimacy; hegemonic ideas are always the subject of 
conflict, and are continually being reconstructed; and resistance is rooted in 
everyday material goals rather than in a ʻrevolutionary consciousnessʼ”.  
Gao Wangling moves on with Scottʼs theory of the domination and resistance 
in Chinaʼs context. The outcome of his research shows that in the Chinese 
feudal society, as termed in Chinese official historiography, the tenants were 
not always obedient in accepting the exploitation of the landlords. They had 
been trying all means to keep as much land output as possible and pay the 
landlords as little as possible. Delay, repetitive and endless delay in rent 
payment, petty theft before harvest, and even organised open resistance in 
paying rents were the tactics used by peasants. Therefore, very often quite a 
large number of landlords fail to collect more than fifty percent of the land 
output as previously agreed with their tenants (Gao 2005, p. 30).   
In Chinese official historiography, the leadership of the CCP plays a key role 
in Chinaʼs contemporary revolution; the workers and peasants and other 
participants among the so-called masses are the ground that the CCP stands 
on. The peasants, like the workers, have been very supportive to the CCPʼs 
revolutionary efforts, and have been keeping in line with the CCPʼs policies. 
However, when the peasants were facing threats or potential threats against 
their interests, they soon started their resistance. During the period of 
Peopleʼs Communes, similar behaviour from the peasants occurred again. 
Gao (2006) termed it as “counter action”, but not “resistance”, since such 
behaviour is not the result of class struggle. Gao thinks the peasantsʼ “counter 
action” is not just a means of keeping the peasants themselves alive in the 
food-shortage time, it is also a form of feedback and driving force functioning 
upon the ruling CCP to adjust its policies. 
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As such, I am going to use the “counter action” of the Chinese peasants as 
my theoretical frame to analyse the interaction between the two key actors 
involved in the analysis of land ownership: the CCP and the peasants. I will 
look into their relations and interactions, and the results that the “counter 
actions” have brought.  
State	  of	  the	  Art	  
After the de-collectivization of agriculture in 1983-1984, the household 
contracting system greatly increased the agricultural output as well as 
peasantsʼ living standard in comparison to the previous period of the Peopleʼs 
Commune. The family-based farming upon small pieces of land soon reached 
its bottleneck. At the same time, the booming industrialization in the urban 
areas started draining young and strong labors from the rural areas, to a 
certain extent, leading to land desertion in many regions. Whatʼs more, during 
the process of urbanization, peasantsʼ rights over land had been seriously 
violated during the process of local governmentʼs compulsory land 
acquisitions. Their land was taken away, but they received little compensation 
(Zhang Wangli et al 2004, Xu Fasheng 2004, Qin Hui 2007). 
Because of the long-term manipulated pro-urban policies, the widening gap 
between the rich urban and the poor rural areas becomes an element of 
instability. As such, the Chinese government started to issue pro-rural 
policies, and the results are not yet very exciting (Chinaʼs National Bureau of 
Statistics 2008). 
Ample research has been done on rural China and the relations between the 
CCP and the peasants (Ralph Thaxton 1983, Yang Dali 1996, David Zweig 
1997, Jonathan Unger 2002, Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2008, Ralph 
Thaxton 2008). As “San Nong”1 issues become the CCPʼs working focus, 
there are many more scholars joining the discussion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “San Nong” issues refer to the development of agriculture (nong ye), rural 
villages (nong cun) and peasants (nong min).  
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In China, most scholars agree that the ambiguity of collective land is an 
important issue, which needs to be addressed and solved. Yet not all of them 
opt to privatization as a solution. Most of them put the emphasis on improving 
the current collective ownership for rural development and refute privatization 
of land as a key (Jonathan Unger 2002, Li Changping 2004, Liu Wei 2004, Liu 
Xiaowei 2006, Wen Tiejun 2009). While some others deliberately proposed 
privatization as a solution (Yang Xiaokai 2002, Wen Guangzhong 2007). 
There are also scholars who avoid using the term “privatization”, instead, they 
believe that only by guaranteeing peasantsʼ rights over the land that present 
rural problems could be solved (Qin Hui 2007, Xu Fasheng 2004, Zhao 
Weipeng 2001); there is a fourth group of thought claiming nationalization of 
all land would be the best way (Xie Qiuyun 1994, Zhao Ming 2005, Liu Jiecun, 
et al 2008).  
The reason the scholars have very diversified arguments seems to be their 
different points of departure. Those who support privatization think peasants 
are able to protect their land and thus prosper if they were given full land 
rights; while those who are against privatization believe only the state and the 
collectives can protect and offer peasants security for life, and they are not 
optimistic that the peasants would be able to keep their land once it is 
privatized, especially when peasants are in a disadvantaged situation against 
interest groups. 
As such, this thesis aims to present the reasons to discuss land ownership in 
China and analyze whether or not changing the ownership, that is, 
privatization, would benefit the peasants in the end under current 
circumstances.  
Scope	  of	  discussion	  and	  sources	  
According to the Land Administration Law of the Peopleʼs Republic of China 
(2004 revision)2 the land ownership in China is stated as follow:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Official English translation prepared by Ministry of Commerce of the 
Peopleʼs Republic of China. In:  
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“The People's Republic of China resorts to a socialist public ownership of land i.e. an 
ownership by the whole people and ownerships by collectives. (Article 2, Chapter I) 
 “Land in urban districts shall be owned by the State. Land in the rural areas and 
suburban areas, except otherwise provided for by the State, shall be collectively 
owned by farmers including land for building houses, land and hills allowed to be 
retained by farmers.” (Article 8, Chapter II)  
The land privatization that I am discussing here is limited to the collective land 
in China. The land discussed hereafter mainly refers to, albeit not exclusively, 
to farming land, it could also include land for building houses, land and hills 
allowed to be retained by farmers (zi liu di, zi liu shan, meaning private plots).?
The timeline of my discussion is from 1949 until the present. The scope of 
discussion will be limited to land privatization related arguments. The 
connotation of “China” here is restricted to the mainland and does not include 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. 
Besides books and journals in English and Chinese, I will be using a large 
amount of online articles, internet forum posts, documents and statistics from 
Chinaʼs newspaper and government websites, websites that are specialized in 
Chinaʼs rural development, blogs and many others.  
 
 
Part II - Background 
Land	  Reform	  (tu	  gai)	  
According to official Chinese Marxist historiography, China had been a feudal 
society for more than two thousand years, a semi-feudal and semi-colonial 
one after the Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860) in the pre-modern history. 
Over the thousand-year-long history, although theoretically all the land 
belonged to the emperor, practically land had long been a commodity and 
private property. Land owners, be it landlords (di zhu) or peasants, were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLa
ws/P020060620320252818532.pdf, last seen October 8, 2009.  
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allowed to buy and sell land. However, in pre-modern China, the emperorʼs 
reach to the peasants was very limited in such a vast-territory empire. His 
officials, magistrates, were heavily dependent on the local gentry class for 
their governance. As a privileged class that enjoys less tax payment or full 
exemption from tax payment (Sun Yigang and Chen Guangyan, 2003) and 
other special rights (such as no service labor), the gentry class was able to 
gradually accumulate wealth and bought land from peasants who encountered 
financial difficulties. Thus the landed gentry class became the majority of 
landlords (Finer 1997).  
As such, over Chinaʼs long history, many uprisings that led to the change of 
dynasties had been successful in gaining wide support from peasants, 
because the peasants were promised to be redistributed land and they had 
been following this tempting idea: “land to the tillers”. The Kuomindang 
(Chinese Nationalist Party) is no exception. As early as in 1924, Sun Yatsen 
declared a “land to the tillers” policy. (Lin Qiquan and Chen Weiding 2007) 
Unfortunately, it was never realized in Chinaʼs mainland. On the contrary, the 
CCP was able to use similar policies as important tools for its growth and 
success.?
As early as in 1927, six years after the CCP was founded, in order to meet the 
demand and therefore gain support from the peasants, especially among 
those with little or without land, the CCP started land revolution in its bases in 
(provincial) border areas3. Since the CCP was able to put these regions under 
control, poor peasants were allocated land confiscated from landlords. With 
such policies favored by the peasants, the CCP was able to give itself a good 
name among peasants, whom the CCP considers as important revolutionary 
force that could support it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In fighting against Kuominang and Japanese army (during Anti-Japanese 
War, 1937-1945), the CCP retreated to remote rural areas and took them as 
bases to preserve its military forces; it also established revolutionary 
governments to administer these areas. These bases were mainly at the 
borders of provinces where Kuominang or the Japanese army had 
comparatively weak control. Such bases are called revolutionary bases (when 
fight against Kuomintang) or anti-Japanese bases.   
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At the very beginning, the CCP aggressively confiscated all the land in its 
base areas, but it changed to mild land policy by making landlords reduce 
rents and reduce loan interests (jian zu jian xi) during the Anti-Japanese War 
(1937-1945) in order to gain support from them also. After 1949, the CCP 
adopted the “land reform” (tudi gaige) policy instead of land revolution “tudi 
geming”. Generally speaking, both before and after 1949, class struggle was 
employed by the CCP as a crucial tool for land redistribution. Yet the 
implementation of land policies vary in different regions, it was “ultra-left” in 
some regions like Dongbei 4  (North-East), but much milder in the West, 
especially in regions where ethnic minorities were the majority (Bai Xi 2009).  
Such land policy has been a critical means to the CCP having deep roots 
among the masses. Besides the CCPʼs official historiography claiming to have 
initiated land reform, Ralph Thaxton (1983), on the other hand, thinks that in 
Taihang Mountain region such changes in landholdings were initiated by 
peasants in late 1945 and early 1946. Nevertheless, the CCP was able to 
design its policies so as to cater to the peasantsʼ needs. The CCP 1947 
Outline Land Law (tudi fa dagang) further legitimizes such redistribution in 
CCP liberated areas. This trend continued until collectivization started. 
Soon after the CCP founded the Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC) in October 
1949 it started to work on land reform policies to lay the foundation for 
socialist construction. At this time, the official estimate of land distribution was 
that landlords and rich peasants (fu nong) account for less than thirty percent 
of the rural population and own about seventy percent of the total land5. To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This is described in the documentary Bao feng zhou yu (Storm) directed by 
Duan Jinchuan, Jiang Yue (2005). Please refer to review in  
http://www.douban.com/review/1842336/, last seen October 4, 2009. 
 
5 Mao Zedong estimated in 1928 that about sixty percent of the land was 
owned by the landlords, and the rest forty percent by the peasants. He was 
giving examples in three counties in Jiangxi Province, the ratio of land owned 
by the landlords ranges from sixty to eighty percent.  From Maoʼs article ??
??????p. 68-69 in Mei, H. (2009). "????????????????
??????????(Mao Zedong's exploration and historical experiences 
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realize socialism, and more importantly, to gain the wide support from the 
peasants, the CCP should eliminate exploitation in China. Therefore, to 
continue its land revolution from 1927 to 1947, it followed the guidelines that 
the land that the landlords were counting on for exploitation should be equally 
distributed among the farming population in the newly liberated areas.  
Led by Chinese political leader Liu Shaoqi6, the drafting of the land reform law 
(tudi gaige fa) was under way.  On August 30, 1950, the government 
publicized the Peopleʼs Republic of China Land Reform Law. According to this 
land reform law, the landlordsʼ land, draught animals, farm implements and 
more-than-necessary-part of grains were confiscated. The rich peasants were 
allowed to keep their self-farmed and rented land if the amount was 
reasonable7. The confiscated land was redistributed to the poor lower strata 
peasants. Landlords were also given a share of land so that they could farm 
to feed themselves as the peasants do. In this period, the peasants were 
given full rights concerning the ownership of the land8.  
However, the land reform did not end poverty for the peasants but bring them 
hope for better life because of the land they received. In Taiping Village, 
Yanguan region of Northern Zhejiang Province, soon after the reform, land 
renting revived among the different strata of the peasants. The reasons vary, 
some rent out land because of migration, some were not able to farm the land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on land issues during the period of Jinggangshan struggle)." In: 
http://www.ccrs.org.cn/show_3888.aspx, last seen August 14, 2009.  
6 Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) was the chairman of the Peopleʼs Republic of China 
(1959–68) and chief theoretician for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
who was considered the heir apparent to Mao Zedong until he was purged in 
the late 1960s. Liu was active in the Chinese labour movement from its 
inception, and he was influential in formulating party and, later, governmental 
strategy. He played an important role in Chinese foreign affairs after the 
communists had gained control of the country. (cited from Britannica) 
 
7 There is no specified number as benchmark of “reasonable”. Decisions on 
whether or not and how much to be confiscated was to be made by the 
provincial government. 
 
8 Please refer to the Appendix I, a document from a county government giving 
peasant full rights over the land owned. 
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due to shortage of capital to invest, some were just being lazy, and in other 
cases owing to many other reasons (Zhang Letian 2005, p. 48-50). As such, 
together with competition among peasants, a new round of land merging 
occurred. As a result, the comparatively strong ones, normally rich peasants, 
took over land from the less competitive ones. Zhang attributed such 
competition to the fact of private ownership, small-scale family farming, 
backward farm implements, limited resources and underdeveloped rural 
market. This is, in fact, another reoccurrence of what happened in the long 
Chinese history: the landless received lands by joining revolutionary forces, 
but because they were not competitive enough and not supported or protected 
by the authorities, the majority of them lost their land not long after land 
redistribution.  
The CCP more or less realized these problems, at least it knew and held the 
opinion that the traditional family-based farming is not productive enough and 
needs interference from the new government. More importantly, in order to 
modernize and industrialize China, the CCP wanted to put in all its resources 
to achieve such a goal. What the newly born Peopleʼs Republic of China had 
was its large number of peasants. Therefore, the state could not but control 
the peasants to produce food for city dwellers and offer raw materials for 
industries (Zhang Letian 2005, p. 50-51). As such, the CCP chose 
collectivization.  
 
Collectivization	  (he	  zuo	  hua)	  
The CCP made two moves to prepare for collectivization. First, the CCP 
Central Committee held the first meeting on mutual aid and cooperation (hu 
zhu he zuo) of agricultural production and passed The CCP Central 
Committeeʼs Resolution on Mutual Aid and Cooperation of Agricultural 
Production (draft) (September 9, 1951). Second, the CCP Central Committee 
made a decision to set up a Rural Work Department (in November 1952), 
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headed by Deng Zihui9. For this Rural Work Department, Mao Zedong gave 
the following instruction: the main task of this division is to promote the CCP 
Central Committeeʼs resolution on mutual aid and cooperation of agricultural 
production. The plan was to accomplish such a task in 10 to 20 years before 
socialist transformation [of private economy] (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 24-25, 
34). The purpose of these moves was only to transform the Chinese peasant 
economy, which was based on individual/family farming. It did not touch the 
issue of private ownership at all. 
On February 25, 1953, the draft of the Resolution was formally passed by the 
CCP Central Committee. It clearly states: we shall promote to have the 
peasants organized, so as to overcome the difficulties of diversified individual 
farming, to help the poor peasants increase the production in a short time and 
have sufficient clothing and food, to enable the state to receive much more 
commercial grains and raw materials for industrial development, also to 
improve the peasantsʼ purchasing power to consume industrial products 
(Zhang Letian 2005, p. 50-51).   
However, Mao proposed the CCPʼs so called general line for the transition 
period of socialist transformation and presented it at the Politburo meeting on 
June 15,1953. According to the general line, the CCP was to achieve the 
transformation of private economy to socialist public economy in 15 years, 
covering agriculture, industries and commerce. It seems to indicate that Mao 
had changed his mind and chosen to speed up the pace of “socialist 
construction”. (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 34-35)  
Under the guide of this general line, the local governments in the rural areas 
were given the task to bring peasants into its agricultural cooperation scheme, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Deng Zihui (1896-1972) was the head of Rural Work Department of CCP 
Central Committee (1952) and deputy Prime Minister of the State Council 
(1954), who played an important role in Chinaʼs rural affairs. Because of his 
support of household production responsibility system, in 1962 he was 
removed from office and the Rural Work Department was abolished at the 
same time. He was considered as a leader representing the interests of the 
peasants. (Peopleʼs Daily 1982)  
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by persuading the peasants with acceptable means of education and 
guidance. (Zhang Letian 2005, p. 50-52)?
With this objective of building socialism in mind, the CCP started its three 
steps for collectivization: Labor Exchange (mutual-aid team or hu zhu zu, 
literally means organized teams with peasants offering mutual help), Lower 
Agricultural Producers Cooperatives (chuji nongye shengchang hezuo she) 
and Higher Agricultural Producers Cooperatives (gaoji nongye shengchang 
hezuo she) (Du Runsheng 2005). 
 
Labor	  Exchange	  
It begins with the Labor Exchange in 1951. The xiang-level (one level below 
the county, rural community) government is responsible for this agricultural 
production cooperation scheme. At this stage, the CCP did not choose to 
change the peasantsʼ private ownership of the land. Peasants did not have to 
give up ownership of the land and it was totally up to the peasantsʼ decision 
on how to farm and what to grow in the fields. Mutual-help teams were 
organized for the convenience of peasants based on their location and 
production needs. The sizes of the teams vary in different regions; it could be 
as small as three households or as big as more than ten10.  
There were two kinds of mutual-help teams: a temporary one and a regular 
one. The former was more loosely organized and existed only during busy 
seasons, while the latter was a more stable organization putting peasants 
together all through the year and better preparing peasants for the Lower 
Agricultural Producersʼ Cooperatives.  
Besides the exchange of labor among the households, there was also 
exchange of labor with grain. For example, a household without ox could use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Please see "???(Labor Exchange )." ????(Shanghai County 
Records ). In: 
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=906, last seen 
September 28, 2009. 
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some otherʼs ox for a day and pay 3,5 kilograms of corn for exchange (Li 
Zhongming n.d.).  
This form of labor exchange had in fact existed already before (Zhang Letian 
2005, p. 52) and continued to exist even after collectivization in many regions. 
This is a form of “self-help” among the peasants in difficult circumstances and 
practically benefited the peasants (Thaxton 1983). As for the calculation of the 
exchange of labor, it was first in working hours and later in many other forms 
as farming hours, working points based on farming activities, etc.  
The purpose of this labor exchange was to improve agricultural production by 
having large-scale farming. However, there were different opinions among the 
leadership. Deng Zihui, who was in charge of the newly established Rural 
Affairs Department of the CCP held the opinion that there could be some 
experiments of such Labor Exchange in some regions; for the rest, the 
peasants should be allowed to make their own decision whether to join this 
scheme or not, especially when they just became masters of their own land. 
Deng Zihuiʼs assistant Du Runsheng11, also thought there should be no rush 
to change private ownership, because the peasants needed some years to 
recover and develop after the wars. Therefore, he thought merging land and 
labor hiring in some regions were the results of market regulation and were in 
fact good for the recovery of agricultural production. Deng and Duʼs opinions 
were in fact underpinning Liu Shaoqiʼs idea of mechanization before 
collectivization, contrary to Maoʼs strategy to change private ownership into 
collective ownership before developing agriculture (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 
32).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Du Runsheng is one of the most senior experts and policy makers on 
agriculture in CCP. He has been holding key positions in agricultural sectors: 
the secretary general of CCP Central Committee Rural Work Department from 
the nineteen fifties to sixties, deputy director of the National Agricultural 
Commission from the end of seventies to the early eighties, director of CCP 
Central Rural Policy Research Office and member of the CCP Central 
consulting commission. He has long been involved in agriculture policy-
making since 1949. (Du Runsheng 2005, back cover)	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For this reason, on June 15, 1953, Mao clearly presented his idea of the 
general line for the transition period during the CCP Central Politburo meeting: 
the government should realize industrialization and transform private 
ownership in agriculture, handicraft industry, capitalist industry and commerce 
in a certain period of time. “A certain period of time” was interpreted as fifteen 
years or a little longer. Therefore, according to Maoʼs plan, private ownership 
was to be eliminated in around fifteen years. (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 35) 
At the same time, Chen Yun12, the then vice premier, proposed a state 
monopoly in grain purchase and sales through compulsory buying at a state-
set price (tong gou tong xiao), which was agreed upon for implementation by 
Mao. The policy was originally meant to guarantee grain supply and stabilize 
market prices. It was later used as another instrument for the CCP to control 
grain and raw materials for industrialization. (Du Runsheng 2005, 40-43) From 
then on, tong gou tong xiao became a long-term policy until 1985 (He 
Yaofang and Zhang Guangqian 2009).  
Lower	  Agricultural	  Producers'	  Cooperatives	  
Once the CCP had the peasants connected via Labor Exchange, the next 
step was to gain more control over agriculture for industrialization by 
organizing peasants in agricultural producersʼ cooperatives. At the end of 
1953, Mao decided to switch the working focus of cooperative transformation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Chen Yun (1905-1995) was one of the last surviving members of the 
fledgling Communist Partyʼs 10,000-km (6,000-mi) Long March (1934-35) 
from southeastern to northwestern China to escape Chiang Kai-shekʼs 
Nationalist troops. During his entire life Chen, who had no formal education, 
remained a highly influential conservative Marxist; during the 1980s he 
opposed the full implementation of paramount leader Deng Xiaopingʼs 
program of modernization and economic reforms. His eventual endorsement 
of reforms was tempered by a stern admonition that the state must never 
permit "the bird to leave the cage." At Dengʼs urging, Chen relinquished his 
posts in 1987 as a member of the Political Bureau and of its Standing 
Committee and as a member of the Communist Party of China Central 
Committee, but he continued to back younger hard-liners who shared his 
conservative ideology and distrust of Western democracy and culture. (cited 
from Britannica)  
?
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from Labor Exchange to developing Lower Agricultural Producers' 
Cooperatives. In fact, even before Maoʼs decision, the local governments of 
Xing County in Shanxi Province and Yongnian County in Zhejiang Province 
had already tried such an approach. (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 28) 
The lower cooperatives were mainly organized geographically based on 
natural villages, the size varies from ten to one hundred households13.  
Membership 
In principle, the peasants were free and were not forced to join the 
Cooperatives but out of their own decision. Once they joined, they were also 
free to quit at the end of the agricultural season (see Model Rules of 
Agricultural Producersʼ Cooperatives (Draft) 1955, Article 15, Chapter II). This 
seems to show that the CCP was quite optimistic with the peasantsʼ 
willingness to become a member of the Lower Cooperatives. It also helped 
overcoming fear and mistrust among the peasants. 
Land 
Different from Labor Exchange, the CCP started to require peasants who join 
the Cooperatives to partly give up their land use rights for collective farming. 
This means, they would not only work on their own land, but also on other 
peopleʼs land. As a matter of fact, their ownership of land was still private. 
Thus the land use rights were separated from ownership and were controlled 
by the Cooperatives, preparing for CCPʼs future moves.  
Production 
By setting up cooperatives, the CCP was able to gradually build up a planned 
economy in the rural areas. The Lower Cooperatives were required to 
gradually meet the demand of the state in organizing agricultural production. 
They were asked to have a detailed yearly production plan on seeds, farming, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Please see " ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (Lower Agricultural Producers' 
Cooperatives)." ? ? ? ? (Shanghai County Records). In: 
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=907, last seen 
September 29, 2009. 
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fertilizers, etc. Members were organized as production brigades (shengchang 
dui) and production teams (shenchang zu), and they were disciplined by 
regulations.  
Pay and benefits  
In the Cooperatives, peasants were paid according to their labor input and 
other contributions such as biological fertilizers. They were also paid a 
reasonable dividend based on the fertility and amount of land they 
contributed. Since peasantsʼ large farming implements and any other large 
production tools, draught animals were proposed to either be rented or sold to 
the Cooperatives, they were entitled to receive reasonable rents or market-
price pay for them  (Zhang Letian 2005, p. 53-54).  
It is important to note that the Cooperatives also set up production funds and 
collectivization funds. The former was used for production, while the latter was 
mainly used to buy or rent peasantsʼ draught animals, farm implements and 
other production materials. Both funds depended on peasantsʼ contributions in 
form of money or contributed items needed by the Cooperatives.  
In order to attract peasants, especially poor ones, the Cooperatives were 
enjoying an exclusive policy, which allowed them to receive loans for 
production. At the beginning, most of those who joined were poor peasants, 
many did benefit by getting this extra support from the government so that 
they could improve production by receiving loans to buy draught animals and 
farm implements (Li Zhongming n.d.). As such, more and more peasants were 
motivated to join the Cooperatives.  
Although cooperatives were totally CCPʼs initiative, it is interesting to note that 
in Shanghai, there were so-called zi fa she or self-organized cooperatives, 
which were organized by the peasants. By early 1955, there were 271 self-
organized cooperatives with 5,400 households, although only 40 of them were 
approved by the government in the end14.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Please see " ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (Lower Agricultural Producers' 
Cooperatives)." ? ? ? ? (Shanghai County Records). In: 
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However, there were also households that did not join the cooperatives. They 
were mainly those households that were comparatively richer and had 
sufficient strong labor in the family, they did not see their interests in joining 
the cooperatives. 
Obviously not all peasants were keen on becoming a member of the 
Cooperatives from the very beginning. In some regions, with examples of 
some areas in Zhejiang and Hebei provinces, local cadres in a high number of 
Cooperatives acted on behalf of their personal political gains and therefore 
were forcing peasants to join the Cooperatives. As a reaction to such 
pressure, many peasants either killed their draught and domestic animals for 
food or sold them for money before joining. Knowing this, Mao took it as a 
sign of warning from the unsatisfied peasants (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 46-49). 
Results 
Although there were still many peasants not interested in joining the 
Cooperatives, nevertheless, with Maoʼs strong-minded push, by the end of 
1954, there were more than six hundred thousand producersʼ cooperatives 
(Du Runsheng 2005, p. 45-46).   
According to Zhang (2005, p. 54), as the process of building up Lower 
Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives was proceeding, the contradiction 
between the collective farming and private ownership of land required the 
changes of production relations, that is, to change the private ownership to 
collective ownership so as to adapt to the development of productive forces. 
As previously indicated, changing the private ownership of land was in fact 
already on the CCPʼs agenda. The Resolution on Mutual Aid and Cooperation 
of Agricultural Production (1953) clearly states that compared to the aim of 
building a “socialist collective agricultural village (shehui zhuyi jiti 
nongzhuang)”, the Lower Cooperative was only at a lower stage of the 
transition period. Similar content can be found in the Model Regulations of 
Agricultural Producersʼ Cooperatives (draft) (1955). This further shows that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=907, last seen 
September 29, 2009. 
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the CCP had a very clear plan for collectivization, preparing for full-scale 
socialist construction.  
?
Higher	  Agricultural	  Producers’	  Cooperatives	  
When the CCP began to work on the transformation of ownership, the 
cooperative transformation reached its third stage: the Higher Agricultural 
Producers' Cooperatives.  
For each Higher Cooperative, there were around 250 households. Below the 
Higher Cooperatives were production brigades, based on natural villages or 
Lower Cooperatives. The production brigades were subdivided into production 
teams, with twenty to thirty members each15. 
Membership 
According to the charter of Higher Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives16, the 
peasants were still proposed to join on voluntary basis and were able to take 
exit with their land, other properties and their shares of the funds. Considering 
the peasants were forced to join the Lower Cooperatives in many regions, it 
could be expected that such voluntary principle would not be strictly kept 
when it came to Higher Cooperatives. 
Land 
At this stage, the peasantsʼ land and production materials had to be 
collectivized if they were members of the Higher Cooperatives. This means 
that private property of land was no longer possible if peasants chose to enter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Please see "?????????? Higher Agricultural Producers' 
Cooperatives)." ? ? ? ? (Shanghai County Records). In: 
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=908, last seen 
September 29, 2009.?
 16	  Central Committee of CCP (1956). "????????????? (Model 
Regulations for Higher Agricultural Producesʼ Cooperatives)." In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/30/content_2393677.htm, last seen 
September 3, 2009. 
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the Higher Cooperative.  
Production 
The agricultural production should be conducted according to the stateʼs plan. 
Cooperatives were required to have long-term production and construction 
plan for at least three years. This means the peasants could no longer decide 
what and how they should farm on the collective land. There were production 
brigades/teams with two different functions: one was specialized in grain 
production and the other for sideline products. They had to fulfill the quota 
assigned to them as planned. To achieve more yields, bonus would be given 
to production brigades/teams if their output exceeded allocated quota. 
Pay and benefits  
At this time, because the peasantsʼ land had become collectively owned, they 
were no longer paid dividend based on their former contribution of land, but 
were only paid according to their labor input. As such, certain standards were 
designed to evaluate peasantsʼ contribution to the Higher Cooperatives. 
In the Higher Cooperatives, the cooperatives started to offer some basic 
social security net for the group of disadvantaged people, including the old, 
the sick, orphans, widows and the handicapped people. However, such social 
security net was very limited and was not aimed at universal coverage.?
The cooperatives were also able to develop institutions to administer and 
manage rural affairs, including production. There was a small administration 
team at the lowest production team level, comprised of team leaders and 
accountant. At higher levels, the administration team was bigger and had 
more functions. By this institution building, the CCP was able to reach and 
have influence in every single village, which prepares for a bigger experiment 
in their agenda.  
Not soon after the Lower Cooperatives were built, the CCP advanced to the 
Higher Cooperatives. This is because, in Duʼs (2005, p. 66) opinion, Mao took 
the cooperative transformation as more of a class struggle and a political 
movement; Mao wanted to have all the people organized to start a campaign 
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[to achieve the vision of building a socialist China]. It also seems that Mao 
thought fifteen years was too long before he could see more concrete results 
of the collectivization; and at the same time it seems Mao wanted to prove 
that he was right when he felt challenged by Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai17 and 
Deng Zihui, who had different opinions against his stands, for example, 
concerning whether or not to start collectivization, the pace of collectivization 
and the Great Leap Forward movement (Du Runsheng 2005). In 1955, Mao 
said a socialist upsurge in the rural areas was to arrive soon. Such a socialist 
upsurge did arrive soon after he reiterated the critical significance of 
collectivization (e.g., he proposed to realize collectivization before 
industrialization) at the 6th Plenary Session of the 7th CCP Central Committee 
in October 1955. By the end of 1956, 96.2% of the peasants joined the 
cooperatives; cooperative transformation was realized except in Tibet and in 
some pastoral areas in some provinces. As such, Maoʼs plan was 
implemented in three years instead of fifteen that he had previously 
anticipated (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 62).  
As the Higher Agricultural Producersʼ Cooperatives was gradually being built, 
the private ownership of land was approaching its end and was progressively 
being replaced by collective ownership in Chinaʼs history. The official 
statement concluded that China had basically achieved the socialist 
transformation of private ownership in means of production by 1956.  
People’s	  Commune	  
The transformation of the private ownership to a public one proceeded as the 
CCP had planned. However, the cooperative transformation did not have the 
effect CCP had expected: in 1956, instead of increasing the total output of 
grains decreased, this was the first decrease in grain output after 1949. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) was a military leader. In 1954 he became 
minister of national defense. In 1959, however, he criticized as impractical the 
policies of the Great Leap Forward, which emphasized ideological purity over 
professional expertise in both the military forces and the economy. Peng was 
deprived of office for a while and in 1965 was sent to the CCPʼs Southwest 
Bureau in Sichuan province. (cited from Britannica)  
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upset the CCP and its leader, Mao. The CCP once believed and voiced out 
loud that collectivization would greatly improve the production forces and 
profoundly benefit the peasants, and China would be able to catch up with 
Britain in fifteen years and the United States in thirty years. Therefore, trying 
an innovative experiment instead of copying from the Soviet Union in 
developing the rural areas could make some difference. (Du Runsheng 2005, 
p. 76-78) 
Whatʼs more, in the opinion of Zhang Letian, there were many defects in the 
Higher Cooperatives. First, it allowed the peasants to join and quit the 
Cooperatives freely, which potentially undermined the validity of the political 
drive behind it. Second, the Higher Cooperatives were led by the xiang-level 
(administrative level between country and administrative village) government. 
However, xiang government is not the legitimate supervising body of the 
Higher Cooperatives and does not own any property in the Cooperatives. This 
contradiction leads to the xiang governmentʼs ineffectiveness in leading and 
supervising the Cooperatives. Thus this situation needed a big change. The 
arrival of the Peopleʼs Communeʼs marked the beginning of this change. 
(Zhang Letian 2005, p. 56-57) 
On the 10th of September 1958, Peopleʼs Daily, the most important CCP party 
newspaper, published the CCP Central Committeeʼs Resolution on the 
Establishment of Peopleʼs Communes in the Rural Areas, which was passed 
at the Enlarged Meeting of CCP Politburo in August 1958. It marked the shift 
from the Higher Producersʼ Cooperatives to the Peopleʼs Commune (also 
known as dashe, meaning big Commune). 
When the Peopleʼs Communes (Big Communes) were built, the administrative 
body xiang was abandoned. The Higher Cooperatives merged and formed 
much larger Peopleʼs Communes. At the very beginning, it was suggested in 
the 1958 CCPʼs Resolution that a xiang was to become a Peopleʼs 
Commune, which had roughly two thousand households. Depending on the 
regional situation and density of the population, there could be two or more 
Peopleʼs Communes in one xiang region, or there could be one Peopleʼs 
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Commune comprised of more than one xiang. What in fact happened was 
that the number of households was much higher than the suggested two 
thousand. In Shanghai, for example, there were only six Peopleʼs Communes 
in total. The smallest one had thirteen thousand households with an 
agricultural population of fifty-three thousand while the largest one had thirty 
thousand households with a population of one hundred and sixty thousand18.  
The number varies across different regions, but generally speaking the 
number of households during the period of big Communes was higher than 
planned. By the end of October 1958, the country had a total number of 
twenty-six thousand Peopleʼs Communes established, covering one hundred 
and twenty million households, which means that the national average 
number of household in each Commune was around 4,615 households19. 
This seems to show that the CCP had made certain achievements in putting 
peasants (at least in numbers) under the big umbrella of Peopleʼs 
Communes, making it easier for the CCP to have better control of them. 
Peopleʼs Commune included not only agriculture, but also industry, 
commerce, culture and education, and the military (gong nong shang xue 
bing), in accordance with the strategy of “simultaneous development” (Byung-
Joon Ahn 1975). It covered every aspect of peopleʼs life, work and study. As 
such, the differences between the administrative body and the Peopleʼs 
Commune gradually faded away, they merged into one body that was in 
charge of all aspects in the area it covered (called zheng she he yi). 
The Peopleʼs Commune achieved CCPʼs goal of completely transforming 
private ownership into collective ownership of land. Through Peopleʼs 
Communes, the state was able to control rural resources according to its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Please see "????? (People's Communization)." ????(Shanghai 
County Records). In: 
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=909, last seen 
September 29, 2009. 
19 Please see "??????????????? (Small Communes merged 
into Big Communes, People's Communization in all China's rural areas)." In: 
http://history.news.163.com/08/0829/09/4KGM6 7IN00012GII.html, last seen 
September 30, 2009. 
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needs. For example, the Peopleʼs Communes could allocate any piece of land 
from production brigades to Commune-owned enterprises and for the 
construction of infrastructure, although it had to be “approved” by the cadres 
of brigades (Central Committee of CCP 1961). There were practices that the 
Communes took land without going through any formalities (Zhang Letian 
2005, p. 58-59). This created ambiguity concerning land ownership after the 
dissolving of the Peopleʼs Communes. 
Besides land, the Peopleʼs Commune also had the power to collect money 
and grain, mobilize the peasantsʼ properties, production teams, brigades, as 
well as labors (Zhang Letian 2005, p. 59).  
On the other hand, the Peopleʼs Communes did benefit the peasants and 
agriculture by mobilizing and using these resources. The Communes 
constructed large-scale irrigation projects and introduced agricultural 
technologies and farm implements, most of which had contributed to the 
development of agriculture. They also built up kindergartens and seniorsʼ 
homes trying to make this as a social welfare for the peasants. (Zhang Letian 
2005, p. 63-65)  
Fom	  Big	  Communes	  to	  Small	  Communes	  
Going hand in hand with the Peopleʼs Commune was the Great Leap Forward 
movement from 1958 to 1960. The aim of the Great Leap Forward was to 
transform Chinaʼs agrarian society into a modern communist society through 
the process of modernizing agriculture and the industry. Due to Maoʼs over-
optimism, cadres set unrealistic goals to pursue agricultural and industrial 
production at high speed. This led to nation-wide cadresʼ practices of claiming 
nonexistent achievements, which was called “wind of exaggeration” (fu kua 
feng), in the agricultural and industrial sectors. (Peng Xizhe 1987, Du 
Runsheng 2005, p. 78-79) 
Mao and other leaders were overjoyed by the rapid increase of the production 
numbers that were reported to them. Under the newly set-up governmentʼs 
monopoly in grain purchase and sales, the government purchasing quotas 
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from brigades increased based on the “great surplus” peasants had achieved. 
This led to the fact that the amount of grain peasants were left with was 
decreasing even in a good harvest year, not to mention the decrease in yield. 
(Zhang Letian 2005, p.61-63, Du Rusheng 2005, p. 40-43)  
At the same time, the Peopleʼs Commune decided to distribute free food to 
the peasants, unfortunately it did not last long because of the food shortage.  
The egalitarianism led to the peasantsʼ lack of motivation to work hard. As a 
result, inefficient input of farming led to a lower output of grain, adding to the 
food shortage created by the national purchasing system. Thus the public 
masses were finally closed down because of running out of grain. (Zhang 
Letian 2005, p. 63)  
The direct consequence the Great Leap Forward and a Peopleʼs Commune 
system was an economic disaster. It led to the rise of national death rate, 
which reached a peak of 25.4 per thousand in 1960 (Peng Xizhe 1987), 
challenging the official claim the three years of starvation was due to a natural 
disaster.  
Due to these problems that emerged during the establishment of Peopleʼs 
Communes, individual and collective resistance (Yang Dali 1996) as well as 
“counter actions” were widespread. Mao himself initiated adjustments from 
above that were approved during the Zhengzhou conference (February 17 - 
March 5, 1959) as a principle of “three-level accounting, with the brigade as 
the basic accounting unit.” (dui wei jichu, san ji suoyou). That is, ownership 
and power were distributed at commune, brigade and team levels instead of 
being exclusively held by the Commune. The Eighteen Issues Concerning the 
Peopleʼs Communes that was revised during the Shanghai Conference 
further specified the production teamʼs rights of ownership and its status as a 
basic unit for production contracting20, it was stated that production teams 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Please see	  CCP (1959). "?????????????(The Eighteen Issues 
Concerning the People's Communes)." In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-01/10/content_2440602.htm, last seen 
October 2, 2009. 
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should organize production based on their own decisions and that the 
brigades and the Peopleʼs Communes should not interfere in the process.   
Just as Zhang Letian (2005, p. 61) had analyzed, the Peopleʼs Commune 
brought the peasants widespread famine instead of the “paradise of 
happiness” the CCP had pictured for them. The deterioration of the rural 
economy changed the peasantsʼ dreams of a better life into disillusionment. 
As a consequence, the Big Communes (dashe) were downsized into small 
Communes (xiao she) in 1959. Each big Commune was divided into two to 
four small Communes. Under each small Commune were production brigades 
(da dui), which were composed of production teams (shengchang dui). The 
size of a small Commune was generally the size of the previous xiang or da 
xiang (merged by two or more xiang), the size of a production brigade was 
about the size of a Higher Cooperative and the size a production team was 
about that of a Lower Cooperative21.  
In 1961, the size of the small Communes was further reduced to roughly the 
size of the large xiangs that existed during the Higher Cooperatives, 
symbolizing CCPʼs adjustment of its policies in response to the economic 
depression.   
Nevertheless, the most important purpose of CCPʼs adjustments was to 
recover agricultural production and get rural areas back to order. It, however, 
did not change peasantsʼ membership in the Peopleʼs Commune and the 
collective status of land. Thus the CCP still kept certain control of the rural 
resources.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
21 Please see "??????????Higher Agricultural Producers' 
Cooperatives)." ???? (Shanghai County Records). In: 
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_x z1.aspx? ID=464&ContentID=908, CCP 
(1961). "??????????????????(Working Regulationsof 
People's Communes in Rural Areas - revised draft)." In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.c om/ziliao/2005-01/24/content_2500797.htm, last seen 
September 3, 2009. 
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Private	  Plot	  
During the process of collectivization, the CCP did not collectivize all the land. 
The peasants were given a small piece of land for sideline production. The 
Charter of Agricultural Producersʼ Cooperatives (draft) states that members of 
the Cooperatives should be allowed to have a small piece of land to grow 
vegetables and other sideline products; The size of this private plot should be 
calculated according to the population and total land of the village, each 
personʼs private plot shall not exceed five percent of the village land/person 
on average (Article 17, Chapter III). In the Charter of Higher Agricultural 
Producersʼ Cooperatives, the same figure is stated for private plot (Article 16, 
Chapter III). This number was capped at ten percent at the 76th Standing 
Committee meeting of the Peopleʼs Congress on 25th June 1957, based on 
Premier Zhou Enlaiʼs22 proposal concerning the private plot. The reason given 
was that Cooperative members should have larger private plots to feed pigs. 
Therefore, number of pigs fed was taken into consideration when they 
calculated the size of private plot allowed (Central Committee of CCP 1956). 
At the very beginning of Peopleʼs Commune, the private plot was confiscated 
and collectivized for other purposes. However, because of the famine, 
considering the stability in rural areas, in November 1960, the CCP circulated 
the Urgent Directives on the Peopleʼs Communeʼs Current Policies in the 
Rural Areas. The directives required the Peopleʼs Communes to return the 
private plots to peasants and not to proceed with collectivization of private 
plots (Central Committee of CCP 1960).  
According to the Regulations on the Work of Peopleʼs Commune in Rural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) was a leading figure in the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and premier (1949–76) and foreign minister (1949–58) of the 
Peopleʼs Republic of China, who played a major role in the Chinese 
Revolution and later in the conduct of Chinaʼs foreign relations. He was an 
important member of the CCP from its beginnings in 1921 and became one of 
the great negotiators of the 20th century and a master of policy 
implementation, with infinite capacity for details. He survived internecine 
purges, always managing to retain his position in the party leadership. (cited 
from Britannica)  
 
Page	  28	  of	  79	  
Areas (draft amendment)23, passed on 15th June 1961, private plots can be 
allocated by the Peopleʼs Commune, the (total) private land generally should 
account for five to seven percent of the total farming land of a production 
team, households are entitled to have long-term use of it. For areas with 
mountains offering burning wood and uncultivated slopes, peasants are 
allowed to have extra private plots (it was called zi liu shan) allocated by the 
Peopleʼs Commune. This extra quota added up to the private plot the 
peasants could farm on. 
 
Peasants’	  counter-­‐action	  during	  the	  collective	  transformation	  
During the land reform, the peasants were actively participating as they 
viewed it as in their interest to do so. When the CCP started the cooperative 
transformation, the peasants were quite supportive of the labor exchange, for 
this had been a traditional practice (Zhang Letian 2005, p. 52).?
However, when it came to the Lower Cooperatives, Zhang (2005, p. 50) 
pointed out, the peasants who were once very cooperative regarding the land 
redistribution did not necessarily support the governmentʼs new ideal objective 
and efforts to move towards a communist society with exclusively public 
ownership. Furthermore, the peasants had their own ideas, and the small-
scale peasant economy (xiaonong jingji) had its own logic of evolution. That 
is, the peasants had their own way of developing and protecting their 
interests; their behavior was consistent with their own material goals and 
could not be easily changed by the CCP. At this stage, some peasants were 
pretty satisfied with the land they had and wanted to remain the owners of 
their plot. However, there are also peasants who were in favor of collectives, 
because they “were able to count on the teamʼs pooled collective land and 
resources as a safety net against personal disaster” like illness or a failed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Please see CCP (1961). "??????????????????(Working 
Regulations of People's Communes in Rural Areas - revised draft)." In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-01/24/content_2500797.htm, last seen 
September 3, 2009. 
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crop (Jonathan Unger 2002, p. 103).  
Nevertheless, the CCP was trying to proceed with collectivization through its 
institutional reaches and by starting a propaganda campaign. The campaign 
involved the criticism of small-scale peasant economy and the promotion of 
the bright future of cooperative transformation. The small-scale peasant 
economy was criticized as being vulnerable; while cooperatives were said to 
provide economic and social security when the peasants were ill, when they 
were burdened with too many children to feed and even if they were illiterate; 
a splendid picture was described: two-story houses installed with electrical 
lamps and telephones, farming with foreign plows and foreign rakes. (Zhang 
Letian 2005, p. 51, 61)  
Even so, not all peasants were attracted by the fancy blueprint the CCP 
pictured for them. There were still many peasants who did not follow the 
CCPʼs guide to join the Lower Cooperatives, because they believed they 
would benefit more from remaining outside of the Cooperatives. In many 
regions, when the cadres were pursuing their recruitment campaign of 
Cooperative members, they used force, threats, seduction or any other means 
to make them join (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 37-38, 48-49).  
Under such circumstances, when the peasants realized that there was no way 
to escape from it because of the political pressure from the cadres, they 
started to either sell or kill the draught animals and domestic animals to 
minimize their losses. They were better off getting money and filling their 
stomachs rather than giving their production away without predictable 
benefits. In Zhejiang province, in 1954, the number of farming ox was reduced 
by fifty-seven thousand; the number of pigs and sheep decreased by one third 
to half (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 49). Mao termed such “counter action” as “the 
rebellion of the production forces” (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 47).  
After the CCP had installed its monopoly in the agricultural sector, the 
governmentʼs purchase quota exceeded the limit of peasantsʼ production 
capacity. Peasants were left with too little grain to satisfy their nutritional 
needs. The quota of grains that peasants were allowed to keep was 360 jin in 
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Northern China and 400 jin24 in the South.  It consisted mainly of wheat, millet, 
corn and sorghum in the North and mainly of rice in the south. However, these 
were mainly unshelled or unprocessed raw grains upon calculation. Such 
quota was only enough for six-month consumption and was only for one adult. 
Without further resources, the peasants were not able to survive. In fact, there 
were already reported deaths related to starvation and peasants got swollen 
faces from eating tree roots. The desperate situations the peasant were in 
resulted in mass riots in Zhejiang province25.   
As such, the government was also redistributing grain to peasants in regions 
suffering from severe food shortages. However, in most cases, these 
returning-sales grain (fan xiao liang) were not enough. Therefore, besides 
selling draught animals and domestic animals, in extreme cases, some 
peasants sold their furniture or even their children to buy food, ate the grain 
seeds, deserted their land and left their villages to beg (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 
49). In the end, this led to lower production output. There was even less food 
available thus more starvation-related deaths and more widespread 
complaints and riots, creating a negative cycle of tragedy. The CCP became 
aware of such big problems and took measures to bring the rural situation 
under control. The CCP soon issued directives, and clearly addressed in one 
of them: 
“Peasants are realistic. If they think increased production will not benefit themselves, 
they will not be enthusiastic about production…. Therefore, all rural work measures 
must be centered on the development of production, must be beneficial to production 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 1 kilogram equals 2 jin, there was slight difference in exact number, the 
number varies in Xiangzhong county, Hunan Province, it was around 480 jin, 
Gao, W. ?. (2006). ???????????????????(An 
Investigation into Chinese Peasants' 'Counteraction' During the Commune 
Period). Beijing, Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe. 
  
25 As cited in Yang, D. L. (1996). Calamity and reform in China : state, rural 
society, and institutional change since the great leap famine. Stanford, Calif., 
Stanford University Press. P. 27-28 
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and to giving play to peasantsʼ enthusiasm for production.”26 
As a result, the CCP had to scale down the targets of collectivization. Mao 
summarized in his slogan: “pause, contraction, and development”. That is, to 
pause cooperative expansion in some areas (for example, in the North and 
North-east China), to contract in some others (Zhejiang and Hebei), and to 
develop in the rest (e.g., new areas) (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 46-51). The 
emphasis was focused on pause and contraction rather than development 
(Yang Dali 1996, p. 29).  
At the same time, the CCP decided that its quota of grain purchase from the 
peasants should be reduced from 1,5 billion kilograms (3 billion jin) to 45 
billion kilograms for the third and fourth quarters of the year 1955. The number 
was once again cut by another 1,5 billion kilograms in May.  
The CCP was expecting to make such compromise to ease the tension 
created by collectivization.  
In order to survive, the peasants strived for extra food by all means. From the 
Lower Cooperatives till the end of the Peopleʼs Commune, the peasants had 
been using their “counter action” to protest and in fact “correct” the CCPʼs 
policies (Gao 2006).  
The main “counter action” was petty theft. Men, women and children, not just 
peasants, but also many cadres stole collective grains. According to Gaoʼs 
interviews of peasants in Shanxi, Guangdong (Canton), Sichuan, Jiangsu, 
Hunan, and many other provinces, he showed us the facts that because of the 
low food quota, the peasants had to “steal” grains and other sideline 
productions in order to fill their empty stomachs (Gao 2006, p. 4-5, 13-24, 
etc.). 
The second “counter action” was lying about the output for private distribution 
(man chan si fen). For this “counter action”, teamwork was required. Cadres of 
the production teams were involved because they themselves were also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 As cited in Yang, D. L. (1996). Calamity and reform in China : state, rural 
society, and institutional change since the great leap famine. Stanford, Calif., 
Stanford University Press. P. 28 
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peasants and received no salary from the government. They reported less 
than the actual amount of production output and distributed the difference to 
peasants. Many of the production team accountants had two books, one for 
the Commune cadres to inspect and one for themselves.  
The third “counter action” was working much more on the private plot instead 
of the collective land. The peasants normally showed up for collective farming, 
but gradually they worked less hard as some less motivated ones were taking 
advantage of hard-working peasants. In the field, some were not taking the 
work seriously and were killing time as long they still received their working 
points. On contrast, when they got home, they started working hard on their 
private plots. They tried their best to use good fertilizers on their own plots 
instead of the collective land. (Zhu Hengpeng 2006) 
We can tell the difference by looking at the output of the private plots. The 
food quota for an adult was 360 or 480 jin per adult. In Shanxi, the output of 
private plot was around 100 to 150 jin per person. In regions with more fertile 
land and better climate, peasants could harvest around 300 jin of grain per 
person. As Gao said, in some areas, the output of the private plot accounts for 
around 43% of the total grain income of a family. Taking in account that the 
size of the private plot allowed was less than 15% of the total, it was big 
difference.  
The fourth “counter action” was grain loans. When peasants were running out 
of food as the end of a year approached, some chose to borrow grain from the 
collective reserves of the production team (Gao 2006). The peasants should 
pay back the grains loaned in the next year. Since the peasants did not have 
enough food every year, they were not able to pay back what they had 
borrowed the previous year. On the contrary, they would need to make 
another loan to survive. In the end, the loaned grains were either paid back in 
cash, partially, or never paid back at all. (Gao 2006, p. 24-35) 
The fifth was peasantsʼ withdrawal from the cooperatives. When the CCP 
decided to put the promotion of cooperatives transformation on hold and even 
reduced the number of Cooperatives, many peasants took this opportunity to 
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start dropping out of the Cooperatives. There were so many peasants 
withdrawing that it became a trend and many more followed suit before the 
CCP started interfering. (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 50-51) 
The last but probably the most important “counter action” was the peasantsʼ 
household responsibility practice. The CCP was working hard on the 
promotion of Cooperatives and collective farming. The peasants saw it more 
profitable to farm on their own like their ancestors had done for thousands of 
years. In some regions, under teamwork with production team leaders, 
peasants initiated household responsibility farming (bao chan dao hu) as early 
as 1956 (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 50). Although this practice was forbidden by 
the CCP, it was revived in 1961 and was “widely adopted by 1962 in response 
to the Great Leap Forward…(Yang Dali 1996, p. 32)”.  
The “counter actions” made the CCP adjust its policies and in fact contributed 
to the downsizing of Big Communes to Small Communes. It re-legitimized the 
private plot (during the Small Commune period), which had been abolished 
under the Big Communes regime. Besides 5 to 7 percent of cultivated land as 
private plots, peasants were allowed to open wasteland for private cultivation, 
as long as it did not exceed 15 percent of the total land. As a result, the 
peasants were taking this opportunity to expand their private plots as much as 
possible (even a fourth of a hectare) when the cadres were busy fending off 
political attacks during the Cultural Revolution (David Zweig 1997, p. 136).   
In 1968, when the CCP was once again trying to gain more control over the 
use of private plots “by using ideology and terror” in address to the peasantsʼ 
“petty bourgeois mentality”, the peasants were still able to keep (all or parts 
of) their plots in collusion with cadres who more or less had the same interest. 
(David Zweig 1997, p. 136). Via their “counter actions”, the peasantry 
continued their successful “bottom-up reform” after the Cultural Revolution.  
With the collapse of the “Gang of Four”, the peasants brought back their 
practice of household responsibility farming (bao chan dao hu). Through their 
actions, they were informing the CCP that its old agricultural policy needed to 
be changed. As such, the open-minded leaders in the CCP like Wan Li 
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recognized the peasantsʼ “protest” and turned a blind eye to their practices. 
Under Wan Liʼs and other top leadersʼ low-profile support, especially in Anhui 
province where Wan Li was the CCP party secretary, the household 
responsibility system (jiating zerenzhi) was finally acknowledged and adopted 
by the CCP as the new form of agricultural production in the rural areas after 
the dissolving of the Peopleʼs Communes. (Du Runsheng 2005, p. 96-116) 
Nevertheless, we should be aware that the household responsibility system 
was not welcomed by all the peasants in all regions. This system was popular 
among families with strong and young labors, but did not particularly serve the 
interests of “families with children who were too young to work, or where the 
husband was weak or sickly or poor at agricultural planning” (Jonathan Unger 
2002 p. 76). In some regions, it was not peasants but CCP leaders from 
above that took the initiative to adopt the household responsibility system 
(Jonathan Unger 2002, p. 96-97, Ralph Thaxton 2008, p. 217-218). At the 
same time, a couple of thousand collectives did not adopt household 
responsibility farming, some of them prospered and became model villages 
even today, among them, there are Liu Zhuang in Henan province, Zhou 
Zhuang in Hebei province and Huaxi in Jiangsu province. (Du Runsheng 
2005, p. 95) 
These “counter actions” did not necessarily occur in all the villages and not at 
all times during the collectivization period. In those production teams that were 
too far away for the state to reach and insert strong influences, the 
collectivization turned out to be functioning pretty well under strong leadership 
of team leaders and cadres, the output increased significantly and peasants 
did benefit (Jonathan Unger 2002). Nevertheless, by these “counter actions”, 
the peasants were warning the CCP that their policies did not necessarily 
always comply with the peasantsʼ interests and therefore needed to be 
modified and “corrected”. 
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Peasants	  “counter	  action”	  in	  the	  post-­‐1978	  period	  
After the household responsibility system was introduced and widely 
implemented as an indirect result of the peasantsʼ previous “counter action”, 
the peasants became more motivated to farm and the agricultural production 
was brought back to order. Generally speaking, since the agricultural output 
increased, the peasants started to have much more to eat than they had 
during the collectivization period. They do not have to have those old 
practices of “counter action” just to survive. However, this does not mean that 
they no longer interact with the CCP with their “counter actions”.  
This first “counter action” in the post-1978 period is related to the contracting 
period of the collective land. After the household responsibility system was 
introduced, the land was to be redistributed frequently. Because the land that 
the peasants farm on may be different in size, location and productivity from 
one year to the next, this discourages peasants to consider long-term land 
investment. They conveyed their dissatisfaction of such a policy by opting to 
use more artificial fertilizers instead of organic ones, which affect the land 
fertility in a long run. To address this problem and having the countryʼs long 
terms interest in mind, the CCP chose to prolong the land contract to thirty 
years (Shi Hongkui 2009) However, this was only a temporary solution. After 
thirty years, the government and peasants would be facing the same problem. 
So the land contract period was again changed to a longer and unfixed term 
(chang jiu bu bian) (Central Committee of CCP 2008). Regarding the period 
that peasants are allowed to use the land, it seems to convey to the peasants 
that they can use the land for an undetermined and long period of time as 
some sort of quasi-private ownership.  
As a result of the peasantsʼ second “counter action”, the state started to allow 
conditioned land circulation. Because of comparatively low profit in farming, 
peasants choose to take on much higher-paid off-farm jobs. For the land they 
contracted from the collectives, they either lease them to relatives and fellow 
villagers (Ma Yongliang 2008) for a small amount of money or no rent at all, or 
just leave their land unfarmed. Besides the low profit prospect and the outflow 
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of rural working force, the current collective land ownership is another reason 
explaining this behavior on the side of the peasants (Zhang Li 2008).  Zhang 
Li explains, peasants still want to keep their share of the collective land, so 
they would rather leave their land unfarmed than give the land back to the 
collectives. According to the statistics of the grain bureau of Hunan province, 
in 2007, 1,3 million mu of grain fields was wasted. This means that about 
5,5% of the total of grain fields was left unfarmed (Zhang Li 2008). Since such 
land abandonment has become a national phenomenon, it conveys a strong 
signal to the state that such consequences may threaten the countryʼs food 
supply. Once again the peasantsʼ “counter action” is taking effect. In The 
Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform and 
Development, which was approved by the CCP Central Committee at a 
plenary session on October 12 in 2008, the government encouraged land 
circulation, which is defined as the circulation of peasantsʼ land contracting 
rights, under the condition that the land shall not be used for other purposes. 
(CCP Central Committee, 2008) 
From collective ownership and collective use rights to collective land and 
private use rights, and again to quasi-private ownership with land circulation, 
all of which are showing that the state still cannot ignore the peasantsʼ 
“counter action”. To a certain extend, such “counter actions” from the 
peasants turned out to be working quite effectively. 
 
 
Part III - Issues of land privatization 
 
Why	  the	  land	  was	  not	  privatized	  with/after	  the	  de-­‐collectivization?	  
1978 marked a turning point for China and especially for the peasants. The 
CCP finally decided to switch its working focus back to economic 
development. However, such switch was not easily achieved.  
Page	  37	  of	  79	  
When the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was over after Maoʼs death, Maoʼs 
successors, including Hua Guofeng27, the general secretary of the CCP, 
inherited his political stands and were still in favour of collectivization (Du 
Runsheng 2005). Although in many regions peasants revitalized the 
household production responsibility (bao chan dao hu) practices and were 
even allowed to do so with acknowledgement of leaders like Wan Li, in the 
resolution passed during the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central 
Committee (1978), the production responsibility system was allowed only 
down to the team level (bao chan dao zu). It was clearly stated that the 
household production responsibility system was not allowed (Central 
Committee of CCP, 1978).  
It was only when pro-reform leaders as Hu Yaobang28 and Wan Li came into 
power and later with Deng Xiaopingʼs support, that the household production 
responsibility system was formally recognized and accepted. Even so, this 
practice still received opposition from conservative leaders and was limited in 
certain regions. In Anhui province, where peasantsʼ household responsibility 
practices received the most support from the provincial head Wan Li, only 
10% of the brigades adopted such experiment by the end of 1979 (Du 
Runsheng 2005, p. 107). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hua Guofeng (1921-2008) was premier of the Peopleʼs Republic of China 
from 1976 to 1980 and chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 
1976 to 1981. 
 
28  Hu Yaobang (1915-1989) was general secretary (1980–1987) and 
chairman (1981–1982) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As general 
secretary of the CCP, Hu was responsible for ensuring that the party 
apparatus carried out the policy directives of Chinaʼs new leadership. He set 
about downgrading the partyʼs discredited Maoist ideology and replacing it 
with a more flexible and pragmatic policy of “seeking truth from facts.” … Early 
in 1987, after several weeks of student demonstrations demanding greater 
Western-style freedom, Hu was forced to resign for “mistakes on major issues 
of political policy.” His death in April 1989 sparked a series of demonstrations 
led by students and others (the Tiananmen Square incident) that culminated 
on the night of June 3–4 with the forceful suppression of demonstrators at 
Tiananmen. (cited from Britannica) 
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In 1982, the No. 1 Document of the Central Committee of CCP finally officially 
recognized the household responsibility system. By the end of 1982, 90% of 
the brigades introduced the household responsibility system (Huang Li et al 
2008). Thus, the No. 1 Document in 1983 moved even further to separate 
administration from the commune, marking the dissolving of the Peopleʼs 
Commune system and thus de-collectivization.  
The collapse of the Peopleʼs Commune system and de-collectivization, to a 
certain extent, symbolized the success of pro-reform leaders over the 
conservative ones in the CCP. Even so, such a step was not easily achieved; 
we can suspect the huge and powerful opposition from the left within the CCP 
if the reformers were to move further and question the collective ownership, 
which was strongly propelled by Mao. This is the first reason that the land was 
not privatized. ?
The second reason is what Klotzbücher (1998) had argued: “the most 
important aim [of the CCP] was increasing agricultural output. Due to the fact 
that touching the land property was a difficult issue and by realizing the 
positive effects of the new institutional arrangement of contracting land, there 
was no need to touch the question of land property.” For the reformers, 
increasing the agricultural output to solve the food shortage, correcting the 
“mistakes” committed by the left and bringing everything back on the right 
track seemed to be the most important tasks after the chaotic governance 
during the Cultural Revolution.  
Besides, the state needed to control agricultural production for its industries. It 
continued its practice of monopolizing agricultural produce purchase and 
sales for its strategy of price scissors.  
The CCP needed to make sure peasants would supply urban dwellers with 
sufficient food. At the same time, it wanted the grain price to be low enough 
for its urban citizens so that it could maintain low salaries for its employees in 
factories. The state also wanted to control the rural sector to supply raw 
materials needed for industries. At the same time, the state had been making 
rural areas as the market for its industrial products. From 1952 to 1986, the 
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state was able to extract a total of 582,3 billion RMB from agriculture with 
price scissors (Li Chongguan 1989, p. 45). As such, only by keeping collective 
land ownership was the state able to achieve such goals.  
There is one more factor that might be a reason as well. That is, the peasants 
did not require the land to be returned to them. It could have been considered 
a big success for the peasants to have influenced their leaders and finally 
made them realize that their previous agricultural policies had great defects, 
which resulted in a dramatic failure. However, the peasants may also have 
been very cautious to take a step further. After experiencing the famine and 
disastrous political movements (the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural 
Revolution), keeping themselves alive by securing food seemed to be an 
important concern. Whatʼs more, many peasants felt safe with collectivization, 
as it offers a form of collective risk sharing. This is the case in some well-off 
regions, for example, in Guangdong province. (Jonathan Unger 2002).   
By not interfering in land ownership but responding to the bottom-up “counter 
action” from the peasants, the reformers in the CCP were in fact able to 
stabilize the society after the collapse of the Peopleʼs Commune. As the CCP 
had to feel the stone when crossing the river (mo zhe shitou guo he29), it 
chose to proceed without changing land ownership as long as the rural 
policies work fine.   
 
Why	  privatization	  should	  be	  discussed	  now?	  
The world has witnessed Chinaʼs great achievements in industrialization in the 
last three decades. However, with the CCPʼs long-term pro-urban strategy 
and dual economy30 practice, the development of the rural areas is far lagging 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  It is a famous quote from Deng Xiaoping. It means the CCP has no 
previous experience to learn from on how to build a socialist society, so it has 
to explore carefully, step by step. Also it does not really know where the 
reforms will lead to. 
 
30 In a dual economy, the economic structure of the rural agricultural sector is 
different from that of the urban manufacturing sector. This concept was 
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behind the cities, creating critical issues and problems, which are the 
foundation for the discussion of privatization. 
1. Widening gap between the urban and rural areas?
With the introduction of market economy and the emergence of private 
companies, the salaries have been increased by folds over the years in the 
developed urban areas. In comparison, the income rise of the rural population 
has been rather slow due to the stagnated agricultural development, leading 
to a widening gap between the urban and rural areas. ?
In 1990, the average annual net income for peasants was 686 yuan, while the 
average for urban citizens was 1,510 yuan, which was a little higher than 
twice of the peasantsʼ average. In the next seventeen years, the difference in 
terms of absolute figures gradually increased. In 2007, the figure was 4,140 
yuan for peasants and 13,786 yuan for urban citizens (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 2008). The former was only about one third of the latter.  
However, this does not include the urban citizensʼ benefits in social welfare, 
health care, housing subsidy, education resources and job opportunities, from 
which the rural population is excluded.  
The dual-economy system of city and countryside created a widening gap and 
big differences between the urban citizens and rural peasants. It has become 
a threat undermining Chinaʼs social stability.?
2. Ambiguous ownership, peasantsʼ land rights and stateʼs land acquisition 
It is believed that land ownership in China has been ambiguous and is still so. 
The state has been using institutional ambiguity for its reform and economic 
development (Peter Ho 2008) when it “feels stones when crossing the river”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
elaborated by W. Arthur Lewis in his 1954 work Economic Development with 
Unlimited Supplies of Labor. In: http://social.jrank.org/pages/1866/dual-
economy.html, last seen March 17, 2010 The most important sign of a dual 
economy in China is the fact that agriculture had to support industrialization 
which is why peasants were confined to their villages by the hukou system 
and forced into a self supporting form of economy while urban dwellers were 
highly privileged and subsidiesed by the state. 
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Such ambiguity, peasantsʼ incomplete land rights and the stateʼs current land 
acquisition practices have become critical factors of Chinaʼs social conflicts 
and rural stagnation.  
  i. Ambiguity of land ownership  
The collective land ownership is both ambiguous and not ambiguous.  
As previously discussed, the land ownership was first handed over from 
peasants to the Higher Cooperatives and then to the Big Communes. When 
the Big Communes were downsized to Small Communes, it was changed to 
“three-level collective ownership” (san ji suo you) based on the collective 
ownership of production brigades (yi dui wei jichu) (Central Committee of CCP 
1961), with the land set to be used by the production teams. As such, the 
production teamsʼ rights of using the lands were secured, although without 
ownership.  
The Communes, however, were not excluded from collective ownership as 
clearly stated in the “three-level collective ownership”. Based on the fact that 
the Communes were entitled to the construction of irrigation and other 
agricultural infrastructure; they had to compensate the production brigades for 
taking away land from them to build Commune factories and schools (Central 
Committee of CCP 1961), the Communes became the owners of the land 
after they compensated the production brigades (Wang Hui 2007).   
When the Peopleʼs Communes system was dissolved, there was no legal 
document clearly stating who would become the owner of the collective land. 
Since the Small Communes were succeeded by xiang or zhen (town) in 
administration, production brigades by administrative villages (xing zheng 
cun), and production teams by natural villages (zi ran cun, also known as 
cunmin xiaozu), logically, the successors would take over and become the 
owners of the land under the name of their predecessors accordingly. Two 
surveys, which covered 215 villages in eight provinces, proved such 
distribution of ownership. That is,  
“…the [cunmin] xiaozu, “or village small group (the former production 
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team) became the de facto owner of the land in most villages. In some 
regions, however, ownership lies with the village itself (the former 
production brigade). In a small minority of cases, ownership reportedly 
resides with the township, the former commune. (Loren Brandt et al 
2002, p. 73) 
The following are the most important legal documents that we can refer to 
concerning the land ownership after the Peopleʼs Commune. The General 
Principles of the Civil Law of the Peopleʼs Republic of China (from April 12, 
1986)31:  
Collectively owned land shall be owned collectively by the village peasants in 
accordance with the law and shall be worked and managed by village agricultural 
production cooperatives, other collective agricultural economic organizations or 
villages committees. Land already under the ownership of the township (town) 
peasants collective economic organizations [Nongming	   jiti	   jingji	   zuzhi] may be 
collectively owned by the peasants of the township (town). (Article 74, Chapter V) 
And in the Land Administration Law of The Peopleʼs Republic of China (2004 
revision)32: 
Land in the rural areas and suburban areas, except otherwise provided for by the 
State, shall be collectively owned by peasants including land for building houses, land 
and hills allowed to be retained by peasants. (Article 8, Chapter II) 
Lands collectively owned by peasants and have been allocated to villagers for 
collective ownership according to law, shall be operated and managed by village 
collective economic organizations or villagers' committee; and those allocated to two 
or more peasants collective economic organizations of a village, shall be operated 
and managed by the corresponding collective economic organization of the village or 
villagers' group; and those have been allocated to township (town) peasant 
collectives shall be operated and managed by the rural collective economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Official English translation prepared by Ministry of Commerce of the 
Peopleʼs Republic of China. In: 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLa
ws/P020060620320966257030.pdf, last seen October 8, 2009. 
 
32  Official English translation prepared by Ministry of Commerce of the 
Peopleʼs Republic of China. Retrieved October 8, 2009, from 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLa
ws/P020060620320252818532.pdf  
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organizations of the township (town). (Article 10, Chapter II)  
These citations make it quite clear that the peasants are collectively owning 
the land, which is administered by village committees or other collectives at 
the grassroots level.  
The laws and regulations listed above were in fact designed by taking into 
consideration the various complicated situations in different regions across 
the country.  
However, the reality is that the village committees, xiang / township 
committees do not always represent and act on behalf all their members 
(peasants). Whatʼs more, many people are unaware of the complicated 
situations. Investigations show that most peasants are unclear about the land 
ownership, even many grassroots cadres and county / township officials think 
the rural land belongs to the state (Han Jun 2003). From a legal point of view, 
a concrete subject of the collective land is not defined at all. 
  ii. Peasantsʼ land rights 
Currently the ownership of collective land belongs to the collectives. Although 
the peasants are collectively “owning” the land, only the legal right of use 
(shiyongquan) is practiced by peasants via the land contracting system. The 
rights to bestow, to collateralize and to mortgage are not defined in any of the 
laws or regulations. The right to sell is clearly defined as unauthorized. Thus 
peasants collectively owning the land does not mean that they have the 
property right of the land.  
It should be noted that even the collectives do not have alienation rights 
(rangduquan), because the land has to be acquired by the state and becomes 
“state-owned” before its use rights can be traded in the market (Zhao Yang 
2007, p. 103-104) for a limited period of time depending on which purpose it is 
to be used for.  
As such, together with the ambiguous collective ownership, unclear and 
incomplete land rights leave loopholes to comparatively better-informed 
cadres and officials who have been practically making full use of such 
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loopholes to take advantage of peasants in many land-related activities, 
leading to the violation of the peasantsʼ land rights (Zhang Wangli et al 2004). 
For this reason, Ma Liangchan (2009) claims that the definition of land rights 
[in practice] is not decided by the law, but by the power of parties involved. 
Jiang Chunhua (2006) simply states that the collective ownership in practice 
[in some areas] is village cadresʼ ownership.?
  iii. Land acquisition 
Ignoring peasantsʼ other rights than farming seems to have continued after 
the reform in 1978, especially as peasants do not have any participative or 
representative role in policy-making.  
Chinaʼs fast economic growth contributes to the fast urbanization process. At 
the same time, local governments provide incentives to build industrial parks 
and development zones, from which they can generate a large amount of 
revenue through land transactions and at the same time add points to the 
local leadersʼ political performances in economic development. Whatʼs more, 
there have been numerous construction projects in transportation and 
infrastructure related to building industrial parks and development zones, 
which became “pandemic” in China with the political push by local officials.   
According to the land administration law (Article 43-45, Chapter V, 2004 
revision), only governments at the county level and above are authorized to 
approve farming land to be used for these development zones and for real 
estate development. As such, county, municipal and provincial governments 
are the major players in selling land. Additionally, in practice, xiang 
governments and village cadres are also able to sell land for non-agricultural 
purposes by using their connections or bribing officials in the county or city 
authorities, and very often they are able to keep a considerable amount of 
profit from these land transactions33. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 This can be found in a large amount of reports and Internet forum posts. 
Just to give some examples here, please see http://blog.tianya.cn/blogger/ 
post_show.asp?idWriter=0&Key=0&BlogID=1865343&PostID=15637589, 
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High-speed urbanization demands a huge amount of land, which the state 
acquires from the collectives according to the land acquisition law. With the 
above-mentioned defects of land ownership, peasantsʼ rights over land have 
been seriously violated by these land acquisition activities. Under the current   
land acquisition law (Article 43, Chapter V, Land Administration Law of the 
PRC, 2004 revision), with the exception of collective land being used by towns 
and villages for the interests of villagers, only state-owned land is allowed to 
be used for construction. Therefore, collective land must be acquired by the 
state and changed to state-owned land before being sold in the market by the 
state (Article 8, Chapter II, Law of the Peopleʼs Republic of China on Urban 
Real Estate Administration). With this collective land acquisition process, 
peasants as the collective of legitimate landowners are deprived of the 
majority of the land added value 34 . According to the calculation of the 
Development Research Center of the State Council, about twenty to thirty 
percent of the land added value is left in rural areas, among which the 
peasants receive only five to ten percent; the local government receives 
twenty to thirty percent; while the companies who are engaged in such 
business activities gain almost half of the land added value.  
Collective land acquisition causes at least two problems. First, land 
acquisitions create landless peasants. This mostly happens to peasants in the 
suburbs during the process of urbanization. Because of urbanization, the 
collectives do not have any more land to contract to the peasants for farming. 
As a solution to this problem, some local governments accept landless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://zm.hbenshi.gov.cn/read.asp?id=2209, http://bbs.dahe.cn/bbs/view 
thread.php?tid=1415371, http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14748/7761929.html, 
last seen November 20, 2009. 
 
34 Land added value is the (commercial) value added when farming land is 
aimed at commercial purposes. For example, farming land is cheap, but when 
it is used to build residential buildings, its value increased by folds. As cited 
from Xu Lin in China Securities Journal (online, published on 1 September 
2006), In: http://www.cs.com.cn/pl/01/200601/t20060109_838436.htm, last 
seen October 28, 2009. 
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peasants as urban citizens and grant them rights to citizenship35. However, 
peasants who only have agricultural skills can only be competitive on the 
manual job market. 
Second, because the government abandoned the annual land redistribution 
policy in favor of a thirty-year long contract system and later changed it to an 
even longer tenure system (chang jiu bu bian)36. In most rural areas, those 
peasants whose land was acquired by the state are no longer able to receive 
different land allocations via redistribution according to family demographic 
changes (Chang Hong 2009). Therefore, for many peasants, the amount of 
land distributed to them shrinks to a minimum, which makes it difficult for them 
to live off their land. 
With limited compensation and at the same time denied access to the social 
security net, which is offered only to urban citizens, these landless peasants 
are facing big difficulties in their lives and it leads to nation-wide occurrences 
of mass incidents (qunti shijian) and peasant appeals to higher level 
governments for justice (shang fang) (Shao Jinju 2004).  
 
  iv. Mobility of peasants and agricultural development 
The hukou (household registration) system has played an important role in the 
development of Chinaʼs urban industries by restricting peasants in agricultural 
production activities. After the reform in 1978, China developed many labor-
intensive industries. Due to the labor shortage in the cities, the state loosened 
its control over the peasantsʼ mobility and gradually allowed them to work as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The CCP introduced the hukou (household registration) system in 1958. 
The purpose was to restrict the mobility of rural population so as to guarantee 
agricultural production to support urban industrialization. Rural population was 
excluded from the social welfare that was solely available to urban citizens. 
The Hukou system is also closely related to the access to urban resources as 
education, health care and others. The hukou system is still valid. The Rural 
population is now given freedom of mobility but is still denied urban social 
welfare and access to these resources.  
 
36  No exact duration of contract is defined; usually it is interpreted as 
permanent tenure system. 
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migrant workers in the cities. On the peasantsʼ side, due to the stateʼs 
monopoly on the low prices of grains and cash crops, the income they gained 
by farming has been quite low. They soon found it more rewarding to take up 
off-farm jobs in the cities.   
Since it is more profitable to take up off-farm jobs than farming, in the long 
run, many peasants become more engaged in their non-agricultural jobs than 
farming. As a result, the contracted collective land that they used to farm on is 
taken over by their relatives or friends. In some cases they receive a small 
amount of rent in return, while in other cases, they do not get anything. There 
are also many cases in which the land is deserted. Because peasants are not 
granted citizenship in the cities, which would allow them to enjoy social 
welfare offered by the state, they do not want to give up their land in the rural 
areas. But at the same time, most of them are not very keen to return to 
farming that is not profitable (Zhu Xinkai, Tao Huaiyin 2006).  
On the other hand, the fragmentation of farming land also affects the 
mechanization and modernization of agriculture. In land distribution, 
egalitarianism and justice were kept as a principle. Thus both fertile and less 
fertile land was equally distributed to peasants. As a result, land contracted to 
peasants is often scattered around in different locations of a village. A survey 
in 1984 showed that the average household was in possession of 10.7 plots 
(James Kaisung Kung 1994, p. 181). Family demographic changes and land 
inheritance traditions turn the fragmented land into even smaller pieces, 
making it more difficult to introduce modern technology in farming.  
As such, agricultural development is experiencing a bottleneck effect because 
of land fragmentation. Whatʼs more, the state might face food shortage if more 
land is deserted.  
In response to these challenges in rural areas, discussions on land 
privatization emerged and invited debates on this topic. 
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What	  are	  the	  arguments	  on	  the	  privatization	  of	  land?	  	  
Concerning the above problems in rural areas, scholars proposed reforms or 
improvements, hoping to solve these problems. The first group of scholars 
believes that peasants are capable of developing agriculture if they are 
granted full land rights (privatization), while the second group assumes the 
peasants are not able to look after themselves and the state or the collectives 
should take over responsibility.  
Among the first group of scholars, Xu Fasheng (2004), Yang Xiaokai (2002), 
Kuai Zhe (2007) and Wen Guangzhong (2007) suggested privatization as a 
solution, while Qin Hui (2007) and Chi Fulin (2002) euphemistically call for 
“land rights to the peasants”. The term “land rights to the peasants” seems, 
less likely than “privatization” to prompt ideological attacks in the current 
political climate in China. As for the second group, Li Changping (2004) and 
Wen Tiejun (2009) believe that only by improving the collective ownership will 
the peasants be protected and prosper. 
 
1. Privatization and land rights to peasants 
By privatization, or “land rights to the peasants”, peasants will become the 
real owners of their land, which means the subject of land is no longer absent 
and the land ownership is no longer ambiguous.  
As such, the government and real estate development companies would have 
to negotiate with peasants instead of cadres if they wanted to acquire land for 
whatever purposes. In contrast to common practice, the government will have 
to pay the peasants a reasonable amount of compensation. (Wen 
Guangzhong 2007, Hu Xindou n.d.), when the government acquires land for 
public interest. Because of the fact that land can only be transferred from one 
person or collective to the other via the state buying the land, local 
governments sometimes acquire land in the name of the state but give the 
land to a private entrepreneur for commercial purposes.  
Privatization will make it more difficult for the government to take over land at 
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will if it acts on behalf of private instead of public interest. More importantly, it 
will be legitimate for peasants to demand much more compensation if the land 
is not expropriated for public interest. This would also greatly reduce the 
cadresʼ rent-seeking opportunities and therefore protect the peasants from 
deprivation of their land. Even if some land were to be acquired by the 
government, the peasants would receive more compensation, which would 
make it possible to financially support themselves to survive and diversify their 
activities once they become landless.  
Qin Hui (2007) firmly believes “land rights to the peasants” is better than land 
rights to officials. He argues that the peasants cherish the land much more 
than the officials do, because the land is much more important to the 
peasants than to the officials and the land is the most crucial for the survival 
for most peasants. However, this is not the case for the officials. Therefore,?
the officials and not the peasants, are more likely to abuse their rights over 
land, although there may be cases when some peasants sell their land 
following an irrational decision.  
As for the social security function that land offers, Qin Hui (2007, p. 123-125) 
argued that land rights to officials does not imply social security to peasants, 
quite on the contrary. Because land can only offer food to peasants, it cannot 
offer health care and education and other means of security. Land rights to 
officials are in fact a way to deprive peasants of their rights by saying “social 
security [referring to the land] cannot be privatized [to peasants]”.  
If land were privatized, peasants would be able to use their land as mortgage 
to get loans from commercial banks. This is the pre-condition to find a solution 
to the current problem of the underdeveloped credit market in rural areas 
(Wen Guangzhong 2007). Wen Guangzhong analyzed this point with 
collective ownership. Commercial banks are unwilling to offer loans to 
peasants if the latter have no mortgage. It is because of the fact that Chinaʼs 
state-owned commercial banks already have a lot of bad loans. With land as 
mortgage, commercial banks would reduce the risk of contracting more bad 
loans. Therefore, privatization would lay a foundation to develop the rural 
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financial market. For this point, “land rights to the peasants” would have the 
same function.  
If peasants had income rights (shouyiquan), which makes it possible for 
peasants to profit from using the land (Zhao Yang, 2007), it would promote 
land circulation and enable large-scale farming by solving the problem of land 
fragmentation (Wen Guangzhong 2007). It is argued that the precondition for 
agricultural modernization is large-scale farming (Sheng Dalin 2006). Authors 
who hold this opinion argue that the current collective land system 
discourages peasantsʼ mobility. Before the household responsibility system 
was changed to long-term tenures in 2008 at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 
CCP Central Committee, in order to keep their rights to own a share of the 
collective land, peasants who take off-farm jobs in the cities have to return to 
their hometowns when it is time for land redistribution. Or, in many cases, the 
land is deserted when peasants go to the cities to seek higher-income jobs?
(Wen Guangzhong 2007). They assume that if the land were private, many 
peasants who have better job opportunities in the cities would lease out or 
even sell their land to other peasants, making it possible to defragment land 
for large-scale farming, which is more suitable to introduce mechanical 
farming (Yang Xiaokai 2002, Wen Guangzhong 2007).  
Besides, privatization directly contributes to agricultural development by 
encouraging peasants to have long-term investments (Yang Xiaokai 2002).   
Supporters of privatization also argue that private land ownership fits the 
current context of China. Xu Fasheng (2004) says, collective ownership in 
China was established and based on Chinaʼs collective farming system during 
the process of collectivization. However, when the Peopleʼs Commune 
collapsed, the ground for collective ownership was gone. Therefore, collective 
ownership should have been abolished along with the Peopleʼs Commune. 
Although collective ownership was not cancelled in order to support industries 
with agriculture, the situation has changed and now it should be a good time 
to do so, especially as the Chinese government is claiming that the urban 
areas should support the development of the rural areas (fan bu nongye) as 
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the latter did for the former in the past. On the other hand, by logic peasants 
should be the masters of the land they till. There is no reason that peasants 
are not.  
?
2. Opposition to privatization 
Adopting a different argument from the advocates of privatization, it seems 
the point of departure of privatization opponents has more to do with the 
peasantsʼ social security. They insist land is the ʻfinal social safety netʼ for 
peasants, and privatization would deprive many peasants of this means of 
safety (Wen Tiejun 2009, Li Changping 2004). Therefore, they propose 
improvements to strengthen collective land ownership.  
Wen Tiejun (2009) argues against privatization by claiming the so-called 
Western logic of privatization does not fit in the context of developing 
countries, especially in China. Wen disapproved the Western argument that 
privatization-plus-market brings large-scale agricultural development. He 
challenged such theory by counter-arguing that it has not been verified in 
developing East-Asian countries. He attributed the success of the European 
model to colonialism. With colonization, these European countries were able 
to transfer their surplus population to their colonies, and at the same time 
exploited their colonies by plundering resources from them. In this way, 
colonialism helped to ease the pressure and conflicts brought by 
industrialization and urbanization.  
However, Wen Tiejun argues, this “successful” experience is not transferrable 
to developing countries. According to his research both inside and outside 
China,  the privatization-development theory only brings developing countries 
(especially the ones with large populations) negative effects such as landless 
peasants, urban “slumization”37 and social instability, which are illustrated by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Slumization” here is used to mean the process of slums come into being 
(in urban areas). This word is also used by Abul Barkat and Shahida Akhter in 
their article A Mushrooming Population - The Threat of Slumization Instead of 
Urbanization in Bangladesh, Harvard Asia-Pacific Review (Winter 2001).  In: 
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the current situations in India, Mexico and Brazil. Unlike the European 
countriesʼ historical experience, these developing countries can only realize 
original capital accumulation domestically, which mainly comes from 
agriculture. Therefore, by adopting land privatization and a free market 
system, they failed to develop their industries. Moreover, the privatization-
plus-market mode led to numerous landless peasants who swarmed into the 
cities, most of them remaining unemployed. Therefore, as long as the 
Chinese government is not able to offer other means of social security to 
peasants, the land must not be privatized (Cao Jinqing 2009). 
On the contrary, Wen Tiejun attributed Chinaʼs non-occurrence of 
“slumization” to its current collective ownership system, which also greatly 
contributed to Chinaʼs soft landing during the financial crises (in 1998 and 
2008). During the financial crises, collective land functions as a buffering 
zone, which eases the pressure of unemployment by offering a safe net for 
the return of laid-off workers (peasants) who are not entitled to any social 
welfare in the cities. Collective land at least solves the problem of survival for 
these unemployed peasants. As such, collective land ownership greatly 
supports the Chinese government in maintaining social stability for 
development.  
However, if the land were to be privatized and were to enter the market 
system, many peasants would become landless. He Xin (2003) believes this 
would definitely be the result of a capitalist free market, which creates the 
polarization of the society. On the other hand, Li Changping (2004) worries 
that this would be the consequence of interest groups taking advantage of 
peasants, as managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) took advantage of 
workers (managers became extremely rich while workers were laid off) (Liu 
Wei 2004).  
Based on his own working experience as a rural cadre (former secretary of 
CCP commission in zhemu xiang in Hubei province), Li Changping (2009) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hapr/winter01_development/index.html, last 
seen November 11, 2009. 
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presents cases of peasantsʼ rights being violated by allies of power groups 
who are mainly local cadres and county officials. Because of such 
experiences and his investigation in Vietnam, Li does not believe privatization 
will benefit peasants. On the contrary, he strongly supports the idea to 
maintain current collective ownership; because he and Wen Tiejun (2009) are 
worried many of the powerless peasants are almost destined to lose land to 
powerful interest groups who have large capital and alliances with local 
officials and cadres. Whatʼs more, without good education and lacking non-
agricultural skills, landless peasants are not competitive in the urban labor 
market and thus are very vulnerable to economic fluctuations. In this case, 
unemployment during financially difficult times would undermine social 
stability (Liu Wei 2004).  
Assuming collective ownership offers a certain protection to peasants, they (Li 
Changping 2004, Wen Tiejun 2009) argue that even under collective 
ownership, according to which the peasants should be protected by the state, 
the peasants are not able to defend themselves against corrupted officials 
and cadres, how are peasants able to keep their land if land were private?  
Even the workers, who are organized via the workersʼ union, could not defend 
their interests when SOEs were privatized, how could the unorganized 
peasants survive land privatization? Land privatization would only make the 
peasantsʼ situation worse (Li Changping 2004, Liu Wei 2004). 
In response to the idea that privatization would contribute to the modernization 
and mechanization of agriculture, there are two different arguments. The first 
one agrees that privatization helps with large-scale farming because it would 
speed up land circulation, but this process would also speed up the widening 
of the gap between the rich and the poor (Zhu Jiyu 1989). Whatʼs more, Li 
Changping (2004) argues that without privatization, land circulation is still 
possible, which is now proved by the CCPʼs current policy on land circulation 
under collective ownership. 
While the second argument rebuts the assumption that privatization would be 
able to defragment the small pieces of land, the supporters of the first 
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argument believe privatization would secure the fragmentation of land, 
because peasants would keep firm hold of their little pieces of land, posing an 
obstacle to land circulation and consequently to large-scale farming (Liu 
Shoubao 1989).  
At the same time, if land were privatized, big agricultural constructions and 
maintenance like irrigation would become a problem for the peasants if they 
were not owned and maintained by the collectives (Zhu Jiyu 1989).  
Besides, Li Changping does not believe that large-scale farming fits Chinaʼs 
situation. His analysis is as follows: Chinaʼs population increases by eleven 
million each year. If China maintains its annual GDP growth rate at eight 
percent, cities could accommodate eight million surplus labors from rural 
areas each year. Thus, in forty years, the rural population would still be eight 
hundred million. Even if the rural labor population were at four hundred million, 
only one hundred and forty million would be needed for agriculture. According 
to Li Changpingʼs research and investigation, the average output of a family-
run farm with five hundred mu38 is fifteen percent lower than the output of a 
household farming with land of only five mu.  As such, he thinks intensive 
family farming has an advantage in agricultural production; therefore there is 
no need for large-scale farming and privatization. Whatʼs more, he argues that 
peasants do not want privatization at the moment.  
While opposing privatization, these scholars are fully aware of the current 
problems concerning the land. As such, they made proposals for 
improvement. 
First, to cope with land acquisition, peasants should be encouraged to 
organize themselves so as to have more negotiating power during land 
acquisition (Wen Tiejun 2009, Li Changping 2004) and the state should 
protect them through the legislation (Li Changping 2004). Li argues that land 
acquisition policy should be designed to protect peasantsʼ interests by giving 
them more compensation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 1 Chinese mu is around 666.67 square meters. 
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Second, to develop agriculture, the state should motivate peasants by 
increasing the price of the agricultural produce and thus making farming more 
profitable for peasants (Zhu Jiyu 1989); at the same time, the state should 
encourage land circulation, however, it should be up to the peasantsʼ own 
decision and the state should establish a special institution to supervise land 
circulation and make sure peasants are protected (Liu Shoubao 1989).  
Third, peasants should once again be encouraged [not forced] to form 
cooperatives in order to benefit from the advantages of collective farming. 
Peasants should also be given more freedom in mobility (Wen Tiejun 2009), 
so that they would have more opportunities to earn money. 
 
What	  if	  privatization?	  
If we put privatization into Chinaʼs context, we need to analyze more carefully   
what it really brings to Chinese peasants, as socialist China has its own 
characteristics. The other issue we need to take into consideration is the 
existence of different situations across this vast country. The economic 
development, local political climate, geographical features and implementation 
of central governmentʼs policies vary in different provinces and regions. Thus, 
privatization would also have different impacts on peasants and local 
economies.  
To analyze how privatization would benefit peasant we have to be fully aware 
that peasants have their own wisdom and logic (Zhang Letian 2005), which 
they inherited from their ancestors, for survival and for development. I will 
examine four aspects, namely, protection of peasantsʼ land rights, agricultural 
development, peasantsʼ income prospect, peasantsʼ social security and the 
hukou system.  
1. Protection of peasantʼs land rights 
Since the 1990s, during the process of Chinaʼs industrialization and 
urbanization, the estimated number of landless peasants increased by three 
million every year (Zhao Peipei 2005, Li Shumei 2007). The total number of 
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landless peasants by the end of 2005 was around forty to fifty million, twenty 
percent of which remain jobless (Zhao Peipei 2005). The number of landless 
peasants is predicted to soar to one hundred million by the year 2020 (Liu 
Sheng 2009). This means that one out of eight peasants would become 
landless in around ten years. It also means there would be around thirty-eight 
to forty-eight million peasants having to seek other means of living than 
farming from 2009 to 2020. According to another set of data from a nation-
wide investigation conducted by Chinaʼs National Statistical Bureau in 200339, 
forty-three percent of the total 2,942 households surveyed became totally 
landless between the year 2000 and 2003.  
These data are telling us that the current collective land system is very limited 
in preventing peasants from becoming landless. On the contrary, the 
problems with collective ownership as discussed created a large number of 
landless peasants. Compared to collective ownership, if peasants were given 
full land rights or private ownership, would their land rights be well protected?  
To a certain extent, the answer should be positive. I agree that clear and well-
defined land rights would reduce local cadresʼ rent-seeking opportunities 
concerning land-related issues.  
In China quite often peasants have been considered as not well educated and 
their capacity and ability to defend their interests has been underestimated. 
However, the lack of proper education does not mean peasants cannot strive 
for survival and development. The peasantsʼ widespread “counter actions” 
during the Peopleʼs Commune period and the country-wide mass incidents 
which took place in recent years show that peasants are not totally passive 
when facing threats. History proves that peasants are aware of what they can 
do to survive. Full land rights would solve the problem of ownership ambiguity 
and make it more legitimate for peasants to defend their interests against 
those who would like to take advantage of them, especially as legal 
awareness is increasing among peasants (Jiang Xuesong 2009). This does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 As cited in Li Shumei (2007), Introduction, in On Social Security System for 
Landless Peasants, p. 1 
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not mean that cases of peasants land rights violations would no longer exist. 
But it would lead to one result: if local interest allies want to seek rents by 
expropriating land from the peasants, they would be expected to face much 
stronger open resistance from peasants. Although with big legal defects in 
practical implementation and nation-wide corruption, the rent-seeking officials 
would still face much higher risks of either being sued or having critical 
resistance and mass incidents by taking away land from the peasants by force 
or paying them too little compensation.  
Since land is a critical resource for the survival of many peasants, it is very 
possible that most of them would refuse to sell their land unless they have to 
do so, say, under desperate circumstances, for instance, if they need money 
to save a family memberʼs life. When they are required to give up their land 
according to land acquisition law, it would be legitimate for them to demand 
more compensation (including social welfare that is still only enjoyed by urban 
citizens at the moment) as a means of security when they become landless.  
This form of compensation would cost the government much more than what 
it has to spend on acquiring land, but isnʼt protection of peasants the purpose 
of the discussions on land reform? This is exactly the purpose of privatization 
or “land rights to the peasants”. In this case, officials would find it more difficult 
to abuse their power by taking away the land in the name of “public interests”.  
However, it seems we also need to take Li Changpingʼs concern into 
consideration. He stated that in many villages many peasants are heavily 
indebted to cadres and officials (Li Changping 2004). If the land were to be 
privatized, this would put peasants in a desperate position, as they would 
have to pay off their debts by selling their land. This could be very true in 
some areas, yet so far no proof shows this is the case nationwide. 
Li (2004) also referred to the privatization of SOEs. He was concerned that 
land privatization would follow the track of the SOEs privatization, which led to 
many laid off workers whereas SOEs managers became rich.  
Qin Hui (2009) argued that land privatization would not lead to the same 
negative effects as SOEs privatization. For SOEs, the privatization process 
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was led by the managers, and workers had no information and thus no 
influence on any decisions made during the privatization process. However, in 
the case of land, the peasants manage and guard the land, therefore 
privatization would not lead to the land being privatized and given to cadres. 
Qin Hui stated that this is the reason why the cadres do not want land 
privatization. With collective ownership, it is much easier for them to seek 
rents and have control over collective land contracted to peasants. With 
private ownership, it would no longer be the case.   
Therefore, more land rights or private ownership for peasants, could be 
comparatively more effective to prevent peasantsʼ land from being taken away 
and thus slow down the pace of governmentʼs push for land acquisitions. 
 
2. Will privatization contribute to further development of agriculture?  
Three factors should be taken into consideration for the development of 
agriculture: the peasantsʼ incentive for long-term land investment, land 
circulation and large-scale farming, and the rural credit market.  
Peasantsʼ motivation to have long-term investment in the land is very 
important for the development of agriculture. According to the previous 
discussion of the peasantsʼ “counter action” regarding the land contracting 
period, peasants were not motivated to have long-term investment in the land 
because the frequent redistribution of land did not serve their interest. As a 
form of “counter action”, the peasantsʼ short-term planning of land use and 
their choice of non-organic fertilizers affected land fertility and land 
development in a long run. In response to such “counter action”, the CCP 
extended the land contract period first to thirty years and later to an unfixed 
term (changjiu bubian) just to encourage peasants to invest for the long run. 
Granting the peasants undetermined period of land contract can be 
interpreted that the peasants were given quasi-private ownership. As such, 
the peasants should be motivated to use their quasi-private land in a more 
responsible manner, and therefore have far-sighted long-term investment.   
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As a result of peasantsʼ “counter action”, the state allows land circulation. 
Land circulation solves the problem of land being wasted. This means those 
peasants who chose to take off-farm jobs as a source of their major income 
for the family can trade their land use rights in the market. On one hand, 
leasing land use rights can bring them some extra income; on the other hand, 
it becomes possible for those peasants who choose to stay in agricultural 
production to have larger pieces of land by renting their fellow villagersʼ land. 
As such, having larger pieces of land means that large-scale farming is 
possible, and it becomes more economically accountable to introduce 
mechanical farming to improve working efficiency, which makes it possible to 
mechanize and modernize agricultural production wherever applicable.   
However, after the state allows land circulation, soon in some regions 
peasants were forced to circulate their land. In Jiangsu province, some county 
governments assigned land circulation quotas to towns and villages [cadres] 
(Zhou Jingwen 2008). Similar situations were found in other provinces (Yu 
Jianrong 2009). It seems that as long as cadres and officials have power over 
the peasantsʼ collective land, the peasantsʼ land rights are under threat. This 
further proves that the current collective land ownership is a source of the land 
problems.   
Whatʼs more, land is much more meaningful to peasants than to the cadres 
and officials. The peasants are counting on the land to offer them food as well 
as to bring them prosperity. However, land to the cadres and officials is more 
of a tool to generate one-off cash and to add points to their political 
performance. It is quite clear that the peasants will use their land in a much 
more responsible manner than the cadres and officials, which means the 
peasants will utilize their land with a long term perspective and not for short-
term purposes, especially when the land is their private property.  
To a certain extent, land circulation contributes to land defragmentation and 
therefore encourages large-scale farming. At the same time, we should also 
consider that when peasants are still having problems to secure off-farm 
income for living and family development in economic fluctuations, they would 
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not give up their land easily. Therefore, the land circulation policy has its 
limitation as a means of land defragmentation.    
As for the rural credit market, it has long been underdeveloped due to the fact 
that state-owned commercial banks are unwilling to offer rural peasants loans. 
But peasants have their own way to finance their activities. Besides borrowing 
money from relatives and friends, peasants have developed different civil 
financial institutions. A traditional civil financial cooperative is called Rotating 
Savings and Credit Association (he hui) (ROSCA)40.  ROSCA has a history of 
about one thousand years and was first readopted by peasants in Fujian and 
Canton in the 1980s (Xiao Shaofang 2005). It soon became popular in other 
provinces (Wang Chenbo 2005). It is estimated that the underground 
financing in China totals around seven hundred and forty to eight hundred and 
thirty billion RMB (Wang Chenbo 2005, Zhang Cheng 2006). However, 
underground financing is illegal and there are many frauds. Therefore, 
developing rural finance was also included into the resolution approved during 
the 3rd plenary session of the 17th CCP Central Committee. Yet considering 
the low price of land lease, I am not very optimistic about the implementation 
of such a policy as peasants are not given land mortgage rights.  
In my opinion, the first two approaches seem to be developing in the direction 
of privatization or quasi-privatization. However, there are ideological concerns. 
Indeed, it is not possible for the CCP to term it in any word similar to 
“privatization” although its moves in rural reform are very close to it. It is 
foreseeable that without full land rights (privatization), manipulation of land 
circulation will continue to exist for a certain period of time. Provided the state 
designs and effectively implements regulations to protect the land and the 
peasants, privatization should be more effective in land defragmentation and 
land circulation. It encourages the expansion of a land circulation market 
covering a much wider region and giving peasants power to decide on their 
own. As for the rural credit market, privatization can contribute to its 
development (Wen Guangzhong 2007) but that cannot work without the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 ROSCA is a group of individuals who agree to meet for a defined period of 
time in order to save and borrow together. (Anderson and Baland 2002, p. 964) 
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stateʼs supporting policies.  
 
3. What are the income prospects for peasants with privatization?  
From the peasantsʼ perspective, it matters a lot whether privatization would 
bring them higher incomes.  
In 2007, the bulk of the peasantsʼ incomes came from household operations 
(production activities in agriculture, forestry, fishery, etc., also include family-
run businesses), of which about sixty percent came from farming (Chinaʼs 
National Statistics Bureau 2008). Since this figure is a national average, the 
ratio should be higher in regions where off-farm job opportunities are limited. 
Only in more developed regions and cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Guangdong, and provinces like Jiangsu and Zhejiang, is wage income greater 
than the income from household operations.  
Income from farming is determined mainly by the field output, the prices of 
grain and sideline products and the costs of production materials (including 
seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.), if the weather were to be favorable for the 
crops every year. Statistics show that both the costs of production materials 
and the prices of grain and sideline products fluctuated from 1990 to 200741. 
When both increased, the costs for production materials increased more than 
the prices for grains and sideline products, while when both decreased, the 
costs of production materials dropped less than the prices for grains and 
sideline products. This shows that production materials in fact have become 
more expensive and make farming less profitable if agricultural production 
remains the same. Therefore, when there is no major price increase for grain 
and sideline products, peasants need to either increase their output by 
improving their efficiency and effectiveness, or by taking up off-farm jobs. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Based on the data from Chinaʼs National Bureau of Statistics 2008 and 
Major Indicators of Rural Economy, Chinaʼs National Statistics Bureau. Both 
can be found on the official website of Chinaʼs National Statistics Bureau. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexch.htm, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/qtsj/ncjjzb/t20021021_38836.htm  
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Obviously there is no direct relation between land ownership and the level of 
peasantsʼ income generated by farming. To increase peasantsʼ income, the 
best approach would be to increase the stateʼs purchase prices for grains and 
sideline products, or to control the costs of production materials to the 
advantage of peasants. 
However, peasants may expect to get higher compensations for their land 
when taken over by the state either for public interests or for commercial 
purposes. Moreover, selling their private land may generate very high one-off 
income, although it does not seem to be a good choice for most peasants in 
the long run. Peasants can also choose to lease their land and look for off-
farm jobs. Therefore, their income would depend on the land leasing market 
and off-farm job opportunities. In this case, privatization may help by 
promoting land circulation as previously discussed.  
Considering food security and Chinaʼs limited farming land resources, the land 
in circulation should only be for agricultural purposes. Thus the land rents 
would not be as rocket-high as the land rent in urban areas. According to the 
current collective land circulation pilot program, the yearly rent for most of the 
contracted farmland is below 1,000 RMB per mu, in most cases between 300 
to 500 RMB.  If the land is to be used for sideline production or located close 
to big cities, the rents are higher than 1,000 RMB42. The situation may not 
change much with private land, because farming is not very profitable as long 
as the previously discussed conditions do not improve. This leasing price is 
too low for the survival of a family that leases the land. Therefore, if peasants 
choose to lease their land, they would have to engage themselves in off-farm 
jobs, which are regulated by the market. This would mean that farmers 
flocking into the cities to find off-farm jobs would rapidly augment in numbers 
and exert pressure on the urban job market which means that wages will be 
going down. 
As a brief summary, privatization empowers peasants to demand more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 These figure given are based on the quotations of an online professional 
land circulation platform “www.tudinet.com”, last seen October 21, 2009.  
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compensation in land acquisitions, yet in the long run, privatization does not 
directly help to increase the peasantsʼ income. It is up to the state to 
implement policies on the price regulations of agricultural produce and 
production materials. ?
?
4. Peasantsʼ social security and the hukou (household registration) system 
Producing food for private consumption is the most important function of the 
land to the peasants. For the landowners, no matter what kind of jobs they 
engage themselves in, their land would provide them with at least the basic 
needs for survival, even if they were to be laid off from their off-farm jobs. As 
such, when peasants are not covered by the stateʼs social welfare system, 
land becomes a guarantee for both the peasantsʼ survival and social stability 
during financial crises. Collective land seems to be more secure for peasants 
as they would always have land to farm on no matter what happens. This is a 
very popular argument among privatization opponents. They (Wen Tiejun, Li 
Changping, etc.) use this argument in support to their stance for maintaining 
public land ownership, because they are concerned that privatization would 
create landless peasants and thus would take away the peasantsʼ final source 
of security. They argue that as there is still a lack of a good welfare system 
offering landless peasants security, landless peasants would be faced with 
critical challenges to survive, which would pose a threat to social stability and 
harmony. They assume collective land ownership is safer for peasants. 
Nevertheless, so far the number of landless peasants appearing every year 
shows that collective ownership is not as safe as they claim. It shows that the 
land itself, which provides peasants with certain security, is not secure when 
facing land acquisitions. On the other hand, land does provide some sort of 
security for the basic needs of the peasants, but it is unable to provide 
security for health, which is another essential need for peasants.  
If the land were so critical to peasants, privatization of the land would seem to 
be a guarantee for security, by offering peasants a “safety net” for their land. It 
should be more effective in helping peasants to keep their land than the 
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collective land does. As for health security, privatization does not help much 
either. But since urban citizens are entitled to enjoy the “security” in basic 
living and health care, why the peasants are not given the opportunity to enjoy 
the same rights? Therefore, it should be the stateʼs responsibility to make 
social welfare also available to the rural population, and the so-called "social 
security" function of the land should not be used as an excuse for not doing 
so.  
Whatʼs more, the peasants have been supporting the CCPʼs strategy of 
developing industries based on the extraction of agricultural surplus for 
decades. Now that great achievements have been made in the modernization 
of industries, the development of rural area and improvement of peasantsʼ 
living hood are still lagging behind. The CCP became aware of the problem 
and announced agricultural support policies since 2004, demanding that the 
state should gradually introduce social welfare to peasants and treat them 
equally as it does to urban citizens. 
Chinaʼs social welfare is closely tied to its hukou system. People without a 
hukou in the city do not have access to state-supported health care, they will 
be discriminated in employment and not eligible for economically affordable 
housing, they will not receive financial aid when they become unemployed, 
and, to certain degree, their children are discriminated against and denied 
access to local education resources. As such, it seems that to have peasants 
included into the social welfare system implies that the state should abandon 
hukou system.  
If hukou policy was to be abandoned, and peasants were to become (“new”) 
citizens and enjoy the same rights as those “old” citizens do. It would offer 
guarantee for landless peasants and migrant workers (peasants), especially 
during economic fluctuations. It also encourages more peasants to be 
engaged in off-farm jobs and those (especially younger generation of migrant 
workers) who are secured stable income to settle down in the cities. This 
would contribute to the transfer of rural surplus labors who normally send 
home remittances, easing the rural employment pressure and increasing 
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peasantsʼ family income, and in the end it helps with the stability and harmony 
in the rural areas.  
However, the CCP has its concerns regarding the hukou issue. If hukou was 
to be abandoned, it can be expected that huge numbers of peasants will flock 
into the cities. This would mean, first, the government would be burdened with 
much higher fiscal budget to cover the extra costs in offering equal resources 
including social security to these “new” citizens; second, the cities with limited 
resources with water, electricity and many others may not have the capacity 
to accommodate the uncontrolled flow of peasants; third, social problems like 
unemployment, crime, environment would also rise if the cities are not well 
prepared to host these new comers. Thus, the situation in the cities might get 
uncontrollable, which the CCP does not want to happen.  
Therefore, the CCP is working to make certain social security also available to 
the peasants. It launched the new rural cooperative medical scheme in 2005 
and new rural pension plan in 2009. However, the benefits that the peasants 
can enjoy from these two new schemes are still not yet comparable to the 
kind of social security that urban citizens enjoy. 
Nevertheless, there is still a large number of peasants migrating between 
cities and the rural areas. To make sure the rural land that the “new” citizens 
(or migrant workers) are in possession of would be still used for agricultural 
purposes, they should be encouraged to either sell or lease (especially for 
those comparatively successful ones who are secured a job and are able to 
settle down in cities) their contracted land, instead of leaving the land 
unfarmed.  
Also, if the peasants were to become equal with the “old” citizens in the cities, 
it means these “peasants” would enjoy more rights because they were 
distributed land on top of having other equal rights with the “old” citizens. In 
this case, if land were to be private, the “old” citizens would demand to be 
equally treated. They would argue that they should also be given a share of 
the land if the land is to be privatized. Or, they would demand the peasants to 
give up the land when they were granted urban citizenship. As such, peasants 
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should be given rights to do so, which means either the land should be private 
or quasi-private (peasants to have rights to sell or lease).  
 
Part IV - Conclusion 
There has been considerable number of land-related conflicts in China, and 
land ownership is a key factor. Besides conflicts in land acquisitions, land 
ownership is also a determinant of peasantsʼ livelihood and future agricultural 
development. As such, land policies deliberately indicate the ruling partyʼs 
reflections and responses to Chinaʼs rural issues. As many arguments are 
aiming at the collective ownership, land privatization was raised as an 
alternative solution. Based on the above discussions and analyses, we can 
draw the following conclusions.  
First, since the CCP collectivized the peasantsʼ land, the peasants have been 
in a very disadvantaged position in protecting their land rights. It turned out to 
collective land ownership, together with legal defects, leaves big loopholes, 
which have been exploited by interest groups to violate the peasantsʼ land 
rights. Private land ownership, to a certain extent, would protect the peasantsʼ 
land rights better than collective ownership does, especially when the 
peasants are facing land acquisitions. 
Second, the CCP wanted to keep the land and the peasants under its control 
for its vision of building a developed socialist country. Yet its policies did not 
always serve the peasantsʼ interest. As a result, the peasants interacted with 
the CCP by means of “counter actions” and have influenced the CCP to 
change and modify its land policies. In fact, under the influence of the 
peasantsʼ “counter actions”, the CCPʼs land policies since 1978 turned out to 
be designed and implemented in the direction of quasi-privatization. The CCP 
has indeed achieved more gains from some of these “pseudo-privatization” 
experiments of rural land (Alan Gelb et al 1993, p. 125), although the CCP 
never used any term similar to privatization in any of its new land policies.  
Third, although private ownership would protect peasantsʼ land rights better, 
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privatization is not a cure for all. To achieve the goal of benefiting peasants 
and developing agriculture in a long run, the CCP should introduce and 
effectively implement pro-rural policies addressing the peasantsʼ needs. The 
state should also offer peasants equal public services like health care, 
pension, and other social benefits.  
 
Future research agenda 
The peasantsʼ “counter actions” may continue as long as land-related 
problems remain unsolved. How does the CCP interact with the peasants 
concerning future land policies? Will the land policies continue in the direction 
of quasi-privatization or privatization in the end? How does the land circulation 
policy influence the peasantsʼ family income and the agricultural 
development? How does this policy change the land distribution among 
peasants and between peasants and the so-called advantaged group, which 
has large capital to buy the land use rights from the comparatively 
disadvantaged peasants? Addressing these questions, future research can be 
conducted on the further development of Chinaʼs land policies; or on land 
circulation policy within the framework of collective ownership, as the impacts 
of this new policy on the peasants and the agriculture in a whole are yet to be 
examined and evaluated.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Page	  68	  of	  79	  
Bibliography: 
  
(1986), General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (??
?????????). Beijing: China Legal Publishing House. 
  
(2004), Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China (Revision) (??
??????????). Beijing: China Legal Publishing House. 
 
163.com (2008), Small Communes Merged into Big Communes, Transformation to 
People's Commune in All China's Rural Areas (???????????????) 
In: http://history.news.163.com/08/0829/09/4KGM67IN00012GII.html, last seen 
September 30, 2009. 
  
Ahn, Byung-Joon (May 1975). "The Political Economy of the People's Commune in 
China: Changes and Continuities." The Journal of Asian Studies 3: 631-658. 
  
Anderson, S. Baland, J.-M. (Aug. 2002). "The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold 
Resource Allocation." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(3): 963-995. 
 
Bai Xi ?? (2009). "Great Land Reform after the Foundation of People's Republic of 
China (?????)." Beijing, Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe. 
  
Bianco, L. (2001). Peasants without the party: grass-roots movements in twentieth-
century China. Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Brandt, L. Huang, J. Li G. Rozelle S. (2002). "Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, 
Fictions and Issues." The China Journal (47): 67-97. 
 
Cao Jinqing ??? (2009). "Stick to the Household Responsibility System, or to 
Choose Land Privatization (????????? ??????? )." Journal of 
Huazhong University of Science and Technology (????????) (1). In: 
http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=14756, last seen December 13, 
2009. 
 
Page	  69	  of	  79	  
Central Committee of CCP (1953). "Resolution on Agricultural Production 
Cooperatives (draft) (????????????????? (??) )."  In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/15/content_2337342.htm, last seen 
September 3, 2009. 
  
Central Committee of CCP (1955). "Model Regulations for Agricultural Producers' 
Cooperatives - draft (?????????????)." In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/28/content_2388255.htm, last seen 
September 3, 2009. 
  
Central Committee of CCP (1956). "Model Regulations for Higher Agricultural 
Produces’ Cooperatives (?????????????)." In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/30/content_2393677.htm, last seen 
September 3, 2009. 
  
Central Committee of CCP (1958). "Resolution on the Establishment of People’s 
Communes in the Rural Areas (????????????????????)." 
In People's Daily (August 29, 1958) 
  
Central Committee of CCP (1959). "The Eighteen Issues Concerning the People's 
Communes (????????????)." In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-01/10/content_2440602.htm, last seen October 
2, 2009. 
  
Central Committee of CCP (1960). "Urgent Directives on the People’s Commune’s 
Current Polices in the Rural Areas?(??????????????????
??????)."   In: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-
01/11/content_2445271.htm, last seen March 8, 2010. 
 
Central Committee of CCP (1961). "Working Regulations of People's Communes in 
Rural Areas - revised draft (??????????(????))." In: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-01/24/content_2500797.htm, last seen 
September 3, 2009. 
  
Central Committee of CCP (1978). "Resolution on Several Issues to Speed up 
Agricultural Development (draft) (???????????????????(?
?)) " In: http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/jd/493900.htm, last seen 
September 5, 2009.  
Page	  70	  of	  79	  
 
Central Committee of CCP (1998). "Resolution on Several Key Issues on Agriculture 
and Rural Work (3rd Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of CPC) (???
????????????????????????????)." In: 
http://www.bjqx.org.cn/qxweb/n3963c24.aspx, last seen November 8, 2009. 
  
Central Committee of CCP (2008). "The Decision on Major Issues Concerning the 
Advancement of Rural Reform and Development (??????????????
?????????)" In: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2008-­‐10/19/content_8647489.htm, last seen March 17, 2010. 
 
Chang Hong ?? (2009). "Pei Chunliang: No More Land Allocation with 
Demographic Changes Is a Common Phenomenon in Rura Areas (???????
??????????????)." In: http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/9528369.html, 
last seen December 13, 2009. 
 
Chi Fulin ??? (2002). Introduction, in  Offer Farmers Guaranteed Land Use 
Rights Absolutely?(???????????). Edited by Chi Fulin. Beijing, China 
Economic Press. 
 
Deng Yisheng ??? (1982). "A Life of Battles and Tribulations: My Father 
Comrade Deng Zihui In Memory (???????? ——?????????)." 
In: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/34136/2543729.html, last seen October 10, 2009 
   
Du Runsheng ??? (2005). Narrative of Du Runsheng: Records of Major Policies 
on China's Rural Reforms (????????????????????). 
Beijing: People's Press. 
  
Finer, S. E. (1997). China: The Golden Century of the Ch'ing, 1680-1780. The 
History of Government from the Earliest Times. Oxford; New York, Oxford 
University Press. III: 3 v. (xvii, 1701). 
  
Gao Wangling ??? (2005). New Theory on Tenancy System: Landlord, Peasant 
and Land Rent (??????-????????). Shanghai, Shanghai Shudian 
Chubanshe. 
  
Page	  71	  of	  79	  
Gao Wangling ??? (2006).  An Investigation into Chinese Peasants' 
'Counteraction' During the Commune Period (??????????“???”??
). Beijing, Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe. 
 
Gelb, A. Jefferson, G. Singhet I. (1993). "Can Communist Economies Transform 
Incrementally? The Experience of China." NBER Macroeconomics Annual 8: 87-133. 
 
Han Jun ?? (2003). "To Define Collective [Land] as Collective-owned by Shares  (
???????????????)." In:  
http://idm.cctv.com/news/financial/inland/20031111/100697.shtml, last seen 
December 13, 2009. 
 
He Yaofang ???, Zhang Guangqian  ??? (2009). "Historical Change from 
State Monopolized Grain Purchause and Sales to Open Market (????????
????????????)." In: 
http://www.hbgrain.com/First/..%5Cnews%5C20090305093102443.html, last seen 
November 10, 2009. 
 
He Xin ?? (2003). "About Rent, Land Privatization and 'San Nong' Issue (???
????????“??”??)." In: 
http://www.hexinnet.com/documents/200303/wentitaolun/guanyudizu.htm, last seen 
December 13, 2009. 
 
Ho, P. (2008). Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights and Social 
Conflict in China (??????????:????????????). Beijing, 
Social Sciences Academic Press (China). 
 
Hu Xingdou ??? (n. d.). "Significance, Problems and Implementation Proposal for 
the Privatization of Rural Land (????????????????)." In: 
http://www.chinareform.org.cn/cirdbbs/dispbbs.asp?BoardID=11&ID=161661&reply
ID=&skin=1, last seen November 12, 2009. 
  
Liang Xianduan ???, Liu Ruochen ???, Huang Li ?? (2008). Stories about 
the five No. 1 Documents (??“????”??????? ). In: 
http://sichuandaily.scol.com.cn/2008/09/19/20080919639515940011.htm, last seen 
December 13, 2009. 
  
Page	  72	  of	  79	  
Jiang Chunhua ??? (2006). On the Legislation and Institutional Guarantee of 
Peasants' Land Rights (?????????????????).  Research on Hot 
Topics of the Construction of Resources-economical and Environment-friendly 
Society and Environment and Resources Law: 2006 Conference of National 
Environment and Resources Law (????????????????????
????????——2006 ????????????). Beijing, Environment 
and Resources Law Society of China Law Society: 1161-1164. 
 
Jiang Xuesong ??? (2009). Increasing Legal Awareness of Rural Residents (??
??????????). In: http://www.sinahrb.com.cn/xnc/ws/2009-03-
27/zNMDAwMDAwMjEzNA.shtml, last seen November 10, 2009. 
 
Klotzbücher, S. (1998). Die Bedeutung des kollektiven Eigentums an Grund und 
Boden für die politische Transformation und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auf dem 
Land in der VR China seit 1978 (Institutions matter: The impact of collective 
ownership of the land on the political transformation as well as economic 
modernization in the countryside of the PRC since 1978). Fakultät für Orientalistik 
und Altertumswissenschaften. Heidelberg, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. 
Master: 99. 
  
Kuai Zhe ?? (2007). "On Privatization of China's Rural Land: adopting multi land 
ownership is a must to solve 'San Nong' Issue and to realize modernization (????
???????——????????????????????“??”??
???????????)." from 
http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=7286, last seen December 13, 
2009. 
 
Kung, J. K. (1994). "Egalitarianism, Subsistence Provision, and Work Incentives in 
China's Agricultural Colectives"." World Development 22(2): 181. 
 
Li Changping ??? (Sep., 2004). "Be Cautious When Proposing Privatization for 
Rural Land (?????????)." ???? (China Land): 27-28. 
 
Li Changping ??? (2009). I am Telling the Truth to Premier (???????). 
Xi’an, Shaanxi Renmin Chubanshe. 
 
Page	  73	  of	  79	  
Li Chongguang, ??? (1989). "Establishing Institutions of Land Ownership and 
Management upon China's Situations (????????????????)." 
Yunan Social Sciences ?????? (6): 36-46.  
 
Li Shumei ??? (2007). On Social Security System for Landless Peasants (???
?????????) . Beijing, China Economic Publishing House. 
  
Li Zhongming ??? n.d. "From Labour Exchange to Higher Cooperatives - Stories 
about the Former Second Agricultural Producers' Cooperative in the 7th District of 
Zichuan County (????????──??????????????????
??)." In: http://www.zhoucun.gov.cn/rendazhengxie/wenshiziliao/13.htm, last seen 
September 2, 2009. 
  
Liu Jiecun ???, Wang Yingying ???, Han Chao ?? (2008). "Problems of 
Rural Land Privatization and Analysis of Land Management (?????????
??????????)." Modern Agricultural Sciences (??????) 15(2). 
 
Liu Sheng ?? (2009). "Laws are to be Passed to Protect Landless Peasants' Rights 
and Interests (???????????????)." In: 
http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2009-03/14/content_2581981.htm, last seen December 
13, 2009. 
 
Liu Shoubao ??? (1989). "Reflection on Land Ownership System: A Criticism of 
Land Privatization (???????????--?????????)." Hunan 
Social Sciences (??????) (5): 17-19. 
 
Liu Wei ?? (May, 2004). "Some Questions on Privatization of Rural Land (???
??????????)." Social Scientist (?????) (3): 103-104. 
 
Liu Xiaowei ??? (2006). "A Criticism of Land Privatization (???????)" 
Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics (????????) (1): 67-
70. 
 
Ma Liangcan ??? (Feb., 2009). "Land Right is an Amalgamation of Rights (??
???????)." China Rural Survey (??????) : 25-33. 
Page	  74	  of	  79	  
  
Ma Yongliang ??? (2008). "Influence of Returned Migrant Workers on Land 
Circulation (?????????????)." In: 
http://www.ncgztx.com/newsshow.asp?id=223, last seen December 13, 2009. 
 
Mei Hong ?? (2009). "Mao Zedong's Exploration and Historical Experiences on 
Land Issues during the Period of Jinggangshan Struggle (???????????
?????????????)." In: http://www.ccrs.org.cn/show_3888.aspx, last 
seen August 14, 2009. 
 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008). China Statistical Yearbook 2008, 
Beijing Info Press. 
  
Peng Xizhe (1987). "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in 
China's Provinces." Population and Development Review 13(4): 639-670. 
  
Qin Hui ?? (May, 2007). "Six Arguments for Peasants’ Land Rights??????
??)." Social Sciences Forum (??????): 122-146. 
 
Qin Hui ?? (2009). "Land Rights to the Peasants Will Not Lead to Land Privatized 
to Those with Power (??????????????)." In: 
http://news.163.com/09/0210/09/51PGHO1900012Q9L_3.html, last seen December 
13, 2009. 
 
Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance. New 
Haven, Conn., Yale University Press. 
  
Scott, J. C. (1990). Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts. New 
Haven, Conn., Yale University Press. 
 
Shao Jinju, ??? (2004). "Investigation and Reflections on the Issue of Landless 
Peasants' Being Granted Citizenship (????????????????)." 
Ningbo Rural Economy (??????) (2). 
 
Page	  75	  of	  79	  
Sheng Dalin, ??? (2006). "Shall Rural Land be Privatized? (????????
?)". In: http://shengdalin.blog.sohu.com/13998725.html, last seen November 9, 
2009. 
 
Shi Hongkui, ??? (2009). "Analysis on thirty-year long land contract (????
?????????)." In: http://www.snzg.cn/article/show.php?itemid-
15990/page-1.html, last seen November 8, 2009. 
  
Shue, V. (1988). The reach of the state: sketches of the Chinese body politic. 
Standford, Calif., Standford University Press. 
  
Sun Yigang, Chen Guangyan ??????? (2003) The History of China’s 
Taxation (?????). Zhongguo Shuiwu Chubanshe. Online version in: 
http://bbs.jjxj.org/thread-96012-1-1.html, last seen February 19, 2010. 
 
Thaxton, R. (1983). China Turned Rightside Up: Revolutionary Legitimacy in the 
Peasant World. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press. 
  
Thaxton, R. (2008). Catastrophe and contention in rural China : Mao's Great Leap 
forward famine and the origins of righteous resistance in Da Fo Village. Cambridge; 
New York, Cambridge University Press. 
  
Unger, J. (2002). The transformation of rural China. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe. 
  
Wang Chenbo ??? (2005). “Secret Unveiled, China's 'Underground Financing' 
Reaches Trillion (???????  ??“????”?????).” In China News (
??????) (Jan. 19, 2005). In: http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2005/2005-
01-19/26/530530.shtml, last seen December 13, 2009. 
 
Wang Hui, ?? (2007). "Unused land of the People’s Commune’s forest farm 
belongs to the villager collective (?????????????????)." 
Hunan Agriculture (????) (12): 26. 
 
Page	  76	  of	  79	  
Wang Xiaojian ??? (editor-in-chief), "Labour Exchange (???)", in Shanghai 
County Records (????). Retrieved September 28, 2009, from 
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=906. 
  
Wang Xiaojian ??? (editor-in-chief),  "Transformation of People's Communes (?
????)." Shanghai County Records (????). Retrieved September 28, 2009, 
from http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=909. 
  
Wang Xiaojian ??? (editor-in-chief),  "Lower Agricultural Producers' 
Cooperatives (?????????)." Shanghai County Records (????). 
Retrieved September 29, 2009, from 
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=907. 
 
Wang Xiaojian ??? (editor-in-chief),  "Higher Agricultural Producers' 
Cooperatives???????????)." Shanghai County Records (????). 
Retrieved September 29, 2009, from 
http://mhq.sh.gov.cn/mhgl_cssy_xz1.aspx?ID=464&ContentID=908. 
   
Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, S. (2008). "The distance between state and rural society in the 
PRC. Reading Document No 1 (February 2004)." Journal of Environmental 
Management 87(2): 216-225. 
  
Wen, Guangzhong (2007). To solve the Three Agrarian Issues, One should not Avoid 
Privatizing Rural Land. In Rural China in Transformation: Chinese Agriculture, 
Peasants and Rural Society in the Era of Reform. Hong Kong, Tide Time Publishing. 
  
Wen Tiejun ??? (Feb., 2009). "Why China Cannot Adopt Privatization for Its 
Rural Land (??????????????) ." Hongqi Wengao (????): 15-
17. 
 
Xiao Shaofang, ??? (2005). "Taiwan's Experience of ROSCA and It's Indication 
for China's Mainland (????????????????)."  Chinese Rural 
Economy (??????) (8): 68-72. 
 
Xie Qiuyun ??? (1994). On Rural Land Reform (??????????), 
collected in: Papers for the 4th Conference of China Land Science Society Members 
on the topic of Land Market and Optimized Allocation of Land Resources (????
Page	  77	  of	  79	  
???????????????????????????????), edited 
by Wang Jialiang ???. Shaanxi: 129-131. 
 
Xu Fasheng ??? (Sep., 2004). "Peasants’s Land Rights Shall Not be Deprived of, 
Reading Mr. Li Changping’s ‘Be Cautious When Proposing Privatization for Rural 
Land?????????????????????????????????) 
." China Land (????): 29-31. 
 
Yang, D. L. (1996). Calamity and reform in China: state, rural society, and 
institutional change since the great leap famine. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University 
Press. 
  
Yang Xiaokai ??? (2002). "Issue in Focus of China's Reform: Dialogue between 
Yang Xiaokai and Jiang Rushan (???????????——????????
??????." Strategy and Management (?????) (5). Online version in: 
http://www.china-review.com/sao.asp?id=6356, last seen December 13, 2009. 
 
Yee, D. (1994). "Book Review on James Scott’s book Weapons of the Weak: 
Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance." In: 
http://dannyreviews.com/h/Weapons_of_the_Weak.html, last seen September 1, 
2009. 
  
Yu Jianrong, ??? (2009). "Rural Land Circulation Preconditioned by 
Guaranteeing Peasants' Rights (??????????????????)." in 
Nanfang Daily (October 29, 2009). 
  
Zhang Cheng ?? (2006). Eight Hundred Billion RMB of China's Underground 
Finance, 90 Percent Invested in Securities and Futures (?????????8000?
? ????????). In: http://www3.chinanews.com.cn/news/2006/2006-01-
04/8/673560.shtml, last seen September 10, 2009. 
 
Zhang Letian ??? (2005). Farewell To [Our] Ideals - Researching into the System 
of the People's commune (???? - ????????). Shanghai, Shanghai 
Renmin Chubanshe. 
 
Page	  78	  of	  79	  
Zhang Li, ?? (2008). "Investigation and Analysis on Hidden Desertation of Rural 
Land (???????????????)." In: 
http://www.studytimes.com.cn/WebPage/xxsb/html/7596.html, last seen November 8, 
2009. 
 
Zhang Wangli ???, Tong Shaowei ???, Liu Yanping  ??? (Feb., 2004). 
"Suggestions for the China’s Land Property Rights Institution Building (?????
??????????)." China Land Science (??????) 18(1): 14-17. 
 
Zhao Ming ?? (2005). "Land: from Collectively-owned to State-owned (??: ?
??????????)." Rural Economy (????) (5): 20-22. 
 
Zhao Peipei, ??? (2005). How To Solve the Problem of Landless Peasants - An 
Interview of Han Jung, Director of Rural Department, Development Research Center 
of The State Council (???????????-- ?????????????
????). People's Daily (December 9, 2005). 
 
Zhao Weipeng ??? (2001). Adopt Land Privatization and Increase Peasants' 
Income ??????? ????????, collected in: Papers for the Seminars 
on WTO and China's Agriculture (WTO?????????????), edited by 
Zhao Huiyan, Li Donghong, Wang Xiujuan ???????????: 155-157. 
  
Zhao Yang ?? (2007). Public Owned and Private Used: Economic Analysis of 
China's Institution of Agricultural Land Property Rights (???????????
?????????). Beijing, SDX (Shenghuo Dushu Xinzhi) Joint Publishing 
Company. 
  
Zhou Jingwen, ??? (2008). Do Not Force Peasants out of Land Mangement ??
??????????). In Xinhua Daily (August 24, 2008). 
 
Zhu Hengpeng, ??? (2006). "Land Institutional Changes, An Old Peasant's 
Perspective (?????: ?????????????)." In: 
http://ie.cass.cn/yjlw/01.asp?id=549, last seen November 8, 2009. 
 
Zhu Jiyu ??? (Nov. 1989). "Questioning Rural Land Privatization (??????
???)." Chinese Rural Economy (??????) : 37-38, 28. 
Page	  79	  of	  79	  
 
Zhu Xinkai ???, Tao Huaiyin ??? (2006). “Investigation Analysis of A Survey 
on Migrant Workers (?????????????)” in Investigation Report on 
China's Migrant Workers (?????????). Research Office of the State 
Council. Beijing, China Yanshi Press. 
  
Zweig, D. (1997). Freeing China's Farmers: rural restructuring in the reform era. 
Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe. 
  
 	  
Page 1 of 2 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
WENFENG WEI 
Email: sonicwwf@gmail.com  
Mobile: +86 13687 517 537 
EDUC ATION   
Oct 2007 – Sep 2009 
European Union’s Erasmus Mundus Masters Programme of Global Studies  -­‐ University of Vienna (Oct 2008 – Sep 2009) -­‐ University of Leipzig – summer school (Jul 2008)  -­‐ University of Wroclaw (Oct 2007 - Sep 2008) 
Sep 1997 – Jul 2001  
B.A. – English -­‐ Fuzhou University  
C ERTIFIC ATES 
 Cambridge Business English Certificate - Higher 
 Certificate of Translation (English-Chinese and Chinese-English) 
 Graduate Certificate in Teaching and Learning in Higher Education 
 TESOL Certificate (Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages)  
 China’s National Teaching Certificate (in linguistics at tertiary education level) 
LAN GUAGE & C OMPUTER SK ILLS 
? Chinese (Mandarin) – native language  
? English – C1 (Council of Europe Level) 
? German – between A1 and A2 
? Highly-skilled user of MS Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Adobe PDF 
PROFESSION AL EXPERIEN C ES 
Nov 2009 – present  
China Institute for Reform and Development  
Director, International Cooperation Centre 
 Responsible for project development as well as the management of the 
implementation of international cooperation projects with UNDP China, GTZ and 
Norwegian Embassy in China 
Aug 2009 – Nov 2009 
UNDP China - Tumen Secretariat 
Page 2 of 2 
Assistant to Senior Programme Officer (Communication & Partnership) – intern 
 Assist in preparing news releases and promotional booklets (drafting, polishing and 
proofreading), maintaining media relations and organizing communication events 
 Assist in maintaining partnership with key GTI partners and developing new 
partners 
Mar 2008 – Jun 2008 
University of Wroclaw (Poland) 
 
Teacher of Chinese language (volunteer, part-time) 
 Initiating the first Chinese class in the university upon needs among the local and 
international students and staff 
Sep 2003 – Aug 2007  
Wuzhou Foreign Language School 
Vice Principal (Sep 2005 – Aug 2007) 
 Manage and supervise the operation of International Foundation Course Project and 
external training sector 
 Promote and implement new project (Cambridge TKT, PET and FCE exams), set up 
an authorized TKT test centre (University of Cambridge ESOL Examinations) 
 Offer consultation to partner education institutes in introducing new English 
language teaching  
Vice Director, International Education Center (Sep 2003 – Aug 2005) 
 Design, implement and manage language teaching institution for our client (Fujian 
University of Traditional Chinese Medicine) 
 Review and assess the operation and effectiveness of implementation 
 Daily operation supervision and HR management, including recruiting and training 
new teaching staff, team building and career development 
Mar 2003 – Aug 2003 
Talent Shanghai Co., Ltd. 
Researcher, Executive Search Department 
 Doing research for executive search projects 
 Preparing official documents: business contracts, reports, financial statements, etc. 
Aug 2001 – Mar 2003 
Fuzhou Napier College, Fuzhou University 
Lecturer 
 Giving English classes and course of Business Communication 
 Develop teaching materials and organize extracurricular learning activities 
 Offer consultancy and support to students 
